



# précis

n. a concise summary of essential points, statements, or facts

## précis Interviews Vipin Narang

Vipin Narang, assistant professor of political science and faculty member of the Security Studies Program, discusses with *précis* his courses on proliferation, South Asian security, and empirical models in IR. He also chats about current research, and Iran's nuclear program.

Narang received his PhD from the Department of Government, Harvard University. His dissertation project systematically explores the effect of nuclear postures in deterring conflict and develops a theory for their origins in regional nuclear powers; it was awarded Harvard's Edward M. Chase prize.



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## Western Intervention in the Balkans

by Roger Petersen

*Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*, is Roger Petersen's recent book. He received the ASN (Association for the Study of Nationalities) 2012 Joseph Rothschild Prize for his work. *précis* features an excerpt from the book.



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## What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like?

by Christopher Clary

Conventional wisdom suggests that India has gained sufficient conventional superiority to fight and win a limited war, but the reality is that India is unlikely to be able to both achieve its political aims and prevent dangerous escalation. *Photo courtesy Wikipedia Commons.*



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## Vipin Narang

Assistant Professor of Political Science at MIT  
Faculty Member of the MIT Security Studies Program

**précis:** You have been busy designing new classes since you came to MIT. Can you tell us about your proliferation class?

**VN:** That is my undergraduate class. The Security Studies Program already has classes on the technology of nuclear weapons, especially at the graduate level. I wanted to teach a class on what states do with nuclear weapons once they have them. For example, how does deterrence work? A lot of classes like this focus on the Cold War. I focus equally on the regional powers. There are seven regional nuclear powers, but the division of labor in the field is overly focused on the super powers. The regional powers have chosen different nuclear strategies, so I give the students a different view of the proliferation landscape than other similar courses offered across the country. Any future nuclear states will look more like this distinct class of states than the superpowers.

I think the students enjoy it. I get a lot of students from nuclear engineering and political science. I start with theory, then discuss the super powers and regional powers. The students really like the discussion of modern topics such as nuclear black markets.

**précis:** You also teach on South Asian security. What are some of the themes of that class?

**VN:** I am just starting that this semester. There are not many classes anywhere on this subject, so it is trial by fire. I wanted to teach about South Asia as a regional system together. This class is in the foreign policy analysis tradition—focusing mostly on India and Pakistan. There are issues on the subcontinent that travel to other regions, but there is increasing focus on security issues in South Asia itself.



*Vipin Narang is assistant professor of political science and a faculty member of the Security Studies Program.*

There are quite a few students from MIT and from outside that are taking it. We focus on internal politics, relations in the region, and external relations with the United States. For the graduate students, it is about a research paper which will hopefully be something they can try to publish or incorporate into their dissertations. I try to have them play with the substance of the theories as applied to particular puzzles and problems in South Asia.

This has been a more difficult class to prepare because the state of the literature on South Asian security is not as well developed as on Chinese security, for example. In India, they don't write doctrine openly—you need clearances, which can take years to get—so this limits the state of the literature. Usually, sources are media reports, so you have to be careful to distinguish between popular conception and what is actually happening.

**précis:** You also teach a graduate course on empirical models in international relations that has students as-

*Photos of Vipin Narang, Kenneth Oye, Roger Petersen, and Christopher Clary are courtesy of Stuart Darsch.*

**précis** is published twice each academic year in order to familiarize readers with the work of the Center for International Studies at MIT. For further information about CIS or *précis*, please contact:

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**assess the claims of published quantitative studies. What have the students found?**

**VN:** The traditional quantitative methods sequence does not always have applied examples. In most schools, the sequence is about learning to do the methods more than looking at how they are applied, though at MIT there is a fair amount of the latter. Nevertheless, there are problems unique to international relations and security studies that motivated a separate class to look at how these methods are applied well or poorly. In general, the methods are more easily applied in the American and comparative politics subfields. The international relations subfield has lagged a bit behind because we focus on macro questions. So, the class is trying to show where the state of the field is. We look at specific methodological issues and assign articles that try to address those problems. We then ask how successful those pieces are. The class complements the strong security curriculum by exposing students to the methodological challenges of doing large-N work in security studies.

The final paper asks the students to assess an existing article. They had fun dissecting data sets. The students found that a lot of results are unstable and that some scholars sometimes overstate the robustness of results. The take home is that we need to be transparent about how strong results are. All results break at some point—in international relations, maybe a little quicker. None of these findings, on their own will stand. So, we always want some theory and some actual cases where the correlation exists. In the battle between methods and research design, good data and design always beats good methods. The problem in international relations tends to be that the data isn't very good.

**précis:** You have written that not all states with nuclear weapons have the same ability to deter attacks on their homeland. You argue that the choice of nuclear postures is an important determinant of the strength of a nation's deterrent. Can you explain how your argument applies to India and Pakistan?

**VN:** Many expected the subcontinent to be stable after India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons. But, Pakistan has a declared first use policy. It threatens to use nuclear weapons to deter conventional power. That policy has allowed Pakistan to support sub-state groups that can then perpetrate mass casualty attacks on Indian metropolises.

India, on the other hand, is trying to primarily deter nuclear use. That is more of a second strike strategy and posture. This has created a discrepancy where Pakistan's posture is really relevant to the situation on the subcontinent and India's is not as relevant. This has created the conditions for periodic attack and some conventional crises. There is an assumption that all attacks can be deterred against nuclear states. But, Israel had nuclear weapons but it was still attacked—Saddam still launched missiles. So, deterrence may depend on how a state operationalizes that capability.

Part of the choice of nuclear posture has to do with the state's goals. These are probably net optimal strategies. India has strong and assertive civilian military relations. I think that explains its retaliatory strategy. China is a similar case. India, because of its size, can survive some attacks. Pakistan cannot afford the same tradeoffs because of its geographic disadvantages.

**précis:** You have an upcoming article on deterrence and nuclear postures. What are your findings? How does it relate to your past work?

**VN:** The large-N part of my dissertation is forthcoming. It is complementary to my earlier article on India and Pakistan that argued that Pakistan's strategy is deterrence optimal and that India's isn't. This looks at other states and conflicts and shows that the argument has wider applicability.

**précis:** Can you tell us how your work has evolved since you came to MIT? Has the community here affected your work in any way?

**VN:** Absolutely. I had my book workshop last month. Having SSP faculty there—they have thought about these

issues for a long time—has really sharpened the theory, arguments, and structure. They pointed out how my work relates to old Cold War debates. It has really improved the manuscript and the arguments in general.

I have been linking it to longer term debates. The US and Soviet Union believed that postures and strategy mattered. Then, at the end of the Cold War, with the growing number of nuclear powers, scholars and policymakers adopted a new outlook that even small or 'existential' nuclear forces were believed to be game changers for states, and that strategy and posture didn't matter. But, I argue that issues of strategy and posture can still really matter as we learned earlier in the Cold War.

Also, one of the best things about MIT and SSP is that the graduate students are really smart. You don't get this anywhere else especially in security studies. It's something special.

**précis:** There are a lot of concerns about Iran's nuclear program. Do you have any thoughts on how America can influence Iran's decisions?

**VN:** The way I look at it is that there is a popular belief that Iran will look more like Pakistan than India as a nuclear power—that it will be aggressive, that it will use nuclear weapons as a shield behind which it will unleash its proxies. But, Iran and Israel don't share a border. So, ground power is not as relevant to Iran as India's is to Pakistan. And, the emboldening aspect of nuclear weapons may not be as relevant in Iran's case. We don't know a lot about Iran's civil-military organs. They have these stove piped organizations. Will it have assertive or delegative command and control structures? If the structures are centralized because of regime paranoia, Iran's nuclear posture will probably look more like India's. In Pakistan, the military runs the program from cradle to grave. It remains to be seen, but I have an open mind as to whether Iran will go one way or another. There are lots of indicators that it will go like India, using nuclear weapons to deter nuclear use and an existential threat to the state. Pakistan, about 10 years after



it acquired nuclear weapons, underwent a lot of organizational cooption of the nuclear program to adopt a first use posture with delegative control.

In the case of Iran, I would tend to focus more on the unit level, domestic variables. As I said, we don't know a lot about civil military relationship in Iran. It is not monolithic in any country. There are trusted and less trusted organizations. It really depends on center-military relationship. The more we know about that the more we can get a fix on what the Iranian nuclear strategy might look like. But if I were to guess, I'd expect that Iran will have highly assertive control with an assured retaliation capability like China or India.

**précis: With the United States planning to draw down in Afghanistan, how do you see the regional security dynamics changing? Is there anything the US can or should do looking ahead to managing these dynamics?**

**VN:** That is a tough question. Part of the problem in Afghanistan is that Pakistan's paranoia about India has always led Pakistan to want strategic depth in Afghanistan even without knowing what that means other than Afghanistan not having an alliance with India. The Pakistanis likely have the upper hand once we draw down given their relationships in Afghanistan. It will be difficult for India to compete without a US presence. India lived with Taliban in the 1990s, and, though there were airplane hijackings, there was no existential threat. India will have to come to terms with Pakistan having more influence there. As long as India doesn't overreact, the situation will be stable. I think India will focus on internal growth and likely won't overreact. To the extent that India can monkey around in

southern Afghanistan, it may, but it isn't going to put its neck on the line to do that. India has not traditionally been an overreaching power. It has enough internal problems to deal with and their covert capabilities aren't as capable as Pakistan's.

**précis: précis: In the past, you have written (see <http://afpak.foreign-policy.com/blog/10113>) that you are less concerned than other analysts about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal being compromised by terrorist groups. Could you tell us why?**

In a crisis, things can get a little hairy. The nightmare scenario is that Lashkar-e-Taiba gets a hold of the weapons. They are as well or better best positioned to acquire a nuclear weapon as any group in the world. Right now, it is believed that the weapons are pretty well controlled by the security services during peacetime. If that changes, the easiest way to get a weapon is to engineer a crisis that makes the Pakistanis disperse their nuclear weapons, making them more vulnerable. The LET could try to precipitate a crisis by attacking India and then making a run at nuclear weapons. It could also pose an insider threat based on its relationship with the army. In general the stewardship procedures are probably pretty secure. But, if the Pakistanis get concerned about survivability of the arsenal, things could change. It also depends on how they move the weapons. If they move them on the road, they will want to reduce signatures, so they could have less convoy security. These aren't high probability scenarios, but they aren't impossible.

**précis: Are there more things that can be done to limit uncertainty about the security of the weapons?**

**VN:** The US probably should not talk so much about render safe options through [special operations force] neutralization, which would be a very difficult operation. On the other hand, Pakistan is going to assume we are working the problem anyway, so there is not much we can do. They are paranoid about Indian and American threats to the survivability of their arsenal. Quantity has a quality all of its own, so they may feel less insecure as they get more weapons. After the Abbottabad raid, they are definitely more paranoid about what the US can do. Whether we have that capability or not, they will probably want to move things around a lot so real time intelligence becomes impossible. The US would only probably consider render safe options in the most extreme of scenarios. And, the probability of success without a nuclear weapon going off.

There was a recent Atlantic article that reported the Pakistanis may do this in peacetime after Abbottabad, but it could just as easily be one big fake out. If the paranoia is so high and they want to keep this shell game moving, you could imagine the dangers. The US has reiterated the security of Pakistani arsenal in peacetime, so they may not be doing this now.

**précis: What are you working on next?**

**VN:** I am trying to get my book manuscript out. Paul Staniland and I are working on a project on Indian security—the content of Indian strategy, drivers, the ideological landscape—so we are trying to spend some time on that as well. ■

# Drug Licensing Process



*Ken Oye holds a joint appointment in Political Science and Engineering Systems and directs the Program on Emerging Technologies (PoET).*

**A** REVIEW PAPER published online in *Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics* promotes further exploration of adaptive licensing (AL) to identify serious safety issues earlier, improve the efficacy of drug therapies in use, and reduce the number of patients exposed to risks.

Under the present system, licensing decisions are based primarily on demonstrations of safety and efficacy of drugs in tightly controlled clinical trials using relatively homogeneous populations of patients that are free from complicating conditions. However, once approved, most drugs are used in uncontrolled settings

by large heterogeneous populations of patients with confounding factors. As a consequence, it is not surprising that with some frequency projections of safety and efficacy based on such trials do not hold for the same drugs in real world use.

Hans-Georg Eichler, Kenneth Oye and colleagues review eight proposals for AL, including Health Canada's Progressive Licensing Project, the MIT Center for Biomedical Innovation's New Drug Development Paradigms, and the European Medicines Agency Road Map to 2015. In addition, the authors identify general considerations successful AL programs need to address, including acknowledgment of acceptable levels of uncertainty, improved public communication of drug safety and efficacy, increased prescription control, and additional surveillance and data collection. Finally, the authors flag unresolved issues that require further research.

This work represents an unusually integrative joint project linking MIT Center for Biomedical Innovation and the MIT Center for International Studies. The paper on AL of pharmaceuticals is part of a larger set of projects, including prior work by Lawrence McCray, Kenneth Oye and Arthur Petersen on adaptive regulation in environment, health and safety and current work by the Program on Emerging Technologies on adaptive management of risks associated with emerging technologies such as synthetic biology supported by NSF Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center.

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# Western Intervention in the Balkans

## *The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*

Roger Petersen



*Roger Petersen is the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and a faculty member of the Security Studies Program.*

*Petersen received the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) 2012 Joseph Rothschild Prize for Western Intervention in the Balkans.*

AT ITS BROADEST LEVEL, this book concentrates on explaining variation in the success or failure of Western intervention in the Balkans from the collapse of communism up to the summer of 2008. With the formation of a strongly pro-EU government in Serbia in the summer of 2008, significant opposition to incorporation into Western institutions and the Western economy disappeared from the region. Not to exaggerate, but in an important sense one type of history had ended in the Balkans. Across this poor and corrupt region, nearly all looked to embrace the democracy and capitalism of the European Union and the United States. No party or leader could offer a coherent alternative. This transformation was perhaps inevitable. The combined gross domestic product of the entire Western Balkans (usually defined as the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia but plus Albania) was dwarfed by that of its Western neighbors. In an era of globalization, these poor states could not advance outside of Europe's orbit. To be sure, significant conflicts and disputes still color the Western Balkan terrain, especially in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia. This book will chronicle the ways those conflicts are still being contested. Yet the era of massive violence and isolation appears to be over.

Although the progression of regional history was likely to reach this stage, there were a few bumps along the way. In what amounted to the bloodiest fighting in Europe since the Second World War, the Bosnian war resulted in the death and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Fifteen years after the Dayton Accords, progress toward the reconstruction of a functioning central state has been uneven. In Kosovo, the Milosevic regime drove over 800,000 Albanians out of their homes. In response, NATO conducted its first armed action, dropping over 26,000 bombs during a period of seventy-eight days to drive Milosevic's forces out of Kosovo.<sup>1</sup> The war not only changed NATO's mission, but also challenged sovereignty norms as a basic principle of the international order. Albanian guerrilla groups escalated violence in Kosovo in 1998, southern Serbia in 2000, and Macedonia in 2001. As late as 2008, radical nationalists in Serbia drew huge vote shares while their followers and sympathizers set fire to the US and other foreign embassies.

Within the course of this drama, the United States and Europe made decisions about whether to intervene and how. The nature of intervention has taken a myriad of forms—informal pressure, sanctions, bombings, etc. In the years following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the United Nations conducted eight peacekeeping missions in the region, NATO carried out four different operations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) worked on several assignments across the Western Balkans. Interventions took their most manifest form in brokered agreements among parties in conflict. In almost every corner of the region, the West has been involved in making these deals. In Bosnia, the Clinton Administration negotiated the 1995 Dayton Accord with special annexes for the cities of Brcko and Mostar; in Macedonia, the West mediated the Ohrid Accord and has continued to serve as arbiter in its evolving implementation; in Eastern Slavonia, the West instituted the Basic Agreement; in southern Serbia, the United States brokered the Konculj agreement; in Montenegro, the West negotiated the Belgrade Agreement and was involved in the Tuzi or Ulcinj accord; in Kosovo, the United Nations' Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) instituted a policy of standards before status, then one of standards with status, and then transferred power to the European Union and yet another form of supervised governance in the form of the Ahtisaari Plan. The West also invested enormous resources in attempting to make these brokered agreements work. The United States spent 22 billion dollars from 1992 to 2003; the European Union spent 33 billion euros just between 2001 and 2005.<sup>2</sup>



The Western-brokered accords just mentioned are a primary empirical focus of this book. In each case, an accord illustrates Western goals and provides criteria for judging whether these goals were successfully reached.


Taken as a whole, these accords also illustrate the Western philosophy toward intervention. I will argue that both Western intervention practice and the social science that evaluates it are driven by a narrow sense of human nature. More specifically, individuals are seen as responding to short-term, largely economic incentives and disincentives, or perhaps to physical threats. Correspondingly, policies are formed along the lines of narrowly conceived “sticks and carrots.”<sup>3</sup> In the words of an American military colonel serving in Iraq, “With a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them.” In another similar vein, interveners apply the logic of rational choice game theory, especially in the form of the “prisoners’ dilemma,” to the conflicts they find themselves in. As with sticks and carrots, the goal is to raise the value of rewards, or to structure penalties in such a way that the relationships among the parties in the conflict can rapidly evolve toward a new “equilibrium” with higher mutual payoffs. In an important sense, this book is an evaluation of this philosophy and the practice that follows from it.

The Western Balkans is a critical case for the study of intervention. Most factors have theoretically lined up to support successful intervention—both carrots and sticks have been abundant. In Bosnia, fourteen years after the Dayton Accords, the international community had poured more money into Bosnia per capita than into any recipient of the Marshall Plan. Under the so-called Bonn powers, international administrators could easily remove uncooperative local political actors, even from positions to which they were democratically elected. The International Criminal Tribunal has tried dozens of war criminals at the Hague. Massive security forces have kept the peace. NGOs have worked to create a strong narrative that places the blame on manipulative elites. Critically, the European Union holds out the promise of membership in exchange for compliance to its wishes. Yet the hope of developing effective central governments made only halting progress. In 2009, Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton Accord, was warning about Bosnia’s possible collapse.<sup>4</sup> In Kosovo, the program of “standards before status” failed to create a functioning multiethnic society or to prevent massive riots in March of 2004, despite having poured enormous resources into a small state of two million people. The West was pouring money into Kosovo at a rate twenty-five times greater than into Afghanistan and had helped fund troop levels at a rate fifty times greater.<sup>5</sup> Some regions in Bosnia, and arguably Macedonia, have seen more success. What explains this variation? The set of accords mentioned form a substantial field of variation from which to examine potential answers to this question.

### **The Methodological Agenda: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Ethnic Conflict**

In terms of the substantive agenda just described, this book is a straightforward social scientific work. I develop and examine hypotheses that explain observed variation in the success or failure of Western intervention policy in one universe of cases, the Western Balkans. At the same time, the book deviates greatly from standard practice and the conventional wisdom in political science. This deviation stems from the discrepancy that I observed over the course of several years of fieldwork in the Balkans between what actors do and the theoretical model of their behavior that underlies Western models of intervention and reconstruction. The individuals I observed had lived through violence and some of them had committed it. Many fled their homes in fear. Some would seek revenge. These individuals often hold deep historically based prejudices; they often cannot value the lives of ethnically distinct others. Many became used to being on top of the political and social hierarchy and had a hard time accustoming themselves to new political realities. In other words, the people I have observed have been through some powerful experiences. These experiences have left a residue. For those who have lived in the conflict regions of the Balkans, the residue of their experience is often as real as the guns and money that form the basis of Western social science accounts. The question is how this powerful but amorphous residue can be incorporated into social science.

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The excerpt from *Western Intervention in the Balkans* was reprinted with permission from Cambridge University Press.

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## Western Intervention in the Balkans

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*“The most basic underlying proposition of this book can be simply stated: broad human experiences leave residues that affect the path of conflict.”*

The most basic underlying proposition of this book can be simply stated: broad human experiences leave residues that affect the path of conflict. This statement will undoubtedly seem banal to many readers. In fact, it flies in the face of the conventional wisdom of US political science as it stood in the early twenty-first century. The view that broad human experience shapes the outbreak and course of conflict has been under consistent assault for much of the post-Cold War era. The current thinking comes in many different forms, and consumers of the literature will recognize the slogans and catchwords of specific versions: greed over grievance, insurgency as technology, elite manipulation, and thugs. Violence is often viewed as a matter of very small numbers of actors, either elites or criminals, making rational decisions to initiate and sustain violence to achieve narrow ends. Despite diversity in details, each of these views holds in common the idea that the daily life of members of large communities is largely irrelevant to understanding conflict.

I believe this view is wrong. The reason for the existence of this view may be that a fundamental goal of social science is to make complicated matters easier to comprehend. In the pursuit of parsimony, simplifying assumptions are necessary. Given the biases of Western society and academia, methods in the study of conflict have been based, either explicitly or implicitly, on the assumption of narrowly rational actors.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps unsurprisingly, both the Western practitioners of intervention and the scholars who study political violence are driven by the same assumptions. Both sometimes fail in their respective endeavors, I argue, because of the overly narrow view of human nature reflected in their practices and methods.

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# MIT-Japan 3.11 Initiative Receives Grant



*Residents of Baba-Nakayama temporary housing in Minami Sanriku enjoy a newly constructed garden pavilion.*

**T**HE CENTER'S MIT-JAPAN PROGRAM received a grant from The Japan Foundation's Center for Global Partnership for the MIT Japan 3.11 Initiative.

The Initiative is MIT's response to the devastating March 2011 earthquakes and tsunami in the Tohoku region of Japan. The \$69,000, one-year grant will be used for planning costs connected with the creation of a symposium and a community center in Minami Sanriku, Japan, a village virtually destroyed during last year's disaster.

This multi-use interim town center will be planned in conjunction with the residents of Minami Sanriku's largest temporary housing site. The center will provide a vital gathering space for this displaced community, offer a wide range of services to the village, and help residents return to their daily routines and draw strength from each other during the rebuilding process.

Richard Samuels, director of the MIT-Japan Program, expressed his enthusiasm for the opportunity to bring political scientists, architects, and planners together in this project. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Studies at MIT.

MIT is also creating a university curriculum as part of a wider effort to study and promote disaster-resilient town planning, design, and reconstruction.

*Prepared by Nancy Angoff, MIT Office of Foundation Relations*

# What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like?

Christopher Clary



*Christopher Clary is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science and an affiliate of the Security Studies Program. He also is an adjunct staff member of the RAND Corporation.*

TOWARD THE END of his presidency, Bill Clinton argued that Kashmir, the territory disputed by India and Pakistan, was ‘the most dangerous place in the world.’<sup>1</sup> Clinton’s second term saw India and Pakistan undergo reciprocal tests of nuclear weapons in 1998, followed in 1999 by the Kargil war, the first conflict between nuclear weapons states since the Ussuri River clashes between the Soviet Union and China in 1969. In the years since Clinton expressed his concern about danger on the subcontinent, India and Pakistan have had two serious military crises provoked by terrorist attacks on Indian soil. On December 13, 2001, terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament building, prompting the first full mobilization of the Indian Army since 1971. More recently, a multi-day terrorist rampage in the Indian city of Mumbai beginning on November 26, 2008, led to widespread speculation that Indian leaders might resort to punitive strikes against Pakistan in retaliation. In both crises, Bush administration officials were intensely concerned that a conventional conflict could “get out of hand” leading to inadvertent conventional or nuclear escalation. Pakistan has refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a conventional military defeat. Therefore, India has sought to develop military options that can cause Pakistan political pain without risking nuclear escalation.<sup>2</sup> Conventional wisdom suggests that India has gained sufficient conventional superiority to fight and win a limited war, but the reality is that India is unlikely to be able to both achieve its political aims and prevent dangerous escalation.

Pakistan’s military leadership has suggested that Indian seizure of substantial Pakistani territory or Indian destruction of substantial portions of the Pakistan Army or Air Force in conflict would be possible triggers for Pakistani use of nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup> As a consequence, India has sought to find ways to fight Pakistan without crossing these redlines. Raw numbers suggest and extant analyses have concluded that India’s conventional edge is substantial and growing, increasing the likelihood that India would use military options in response to the most likely provocation: a terrorist attack inside India linked to Pakistan. Walter Ladwig, in a 2007 analysis, worried that “as the Indian Army enhances its ability to achieve a quick decision against Pakistan,” Indian politicians would be more inclined to employ force to achieve political ends.<sup>4</sup> Ladwig’s work, along with others, has examined doctrinal innovation by the Indian Army, which has sought to develop limited options to be used for punitive or coercive objectives against Pakistan without leading to a full scale war.

While India is developing limited options, my analysis suggests India’s military advantage over Pakistan is much less substantial than is commonly believed. This means the outcomes over limited military campaigns are uncertain, with some chance they will not achieve India’s political objectives. Such limited military campaigns are also risky, because if they are unsuccessful with limited force, there will be strong pressures for combatants to escalate and attempt to achieve more decisive political results. The remainder of this piece will provide short reviews of the current military balance at sea, air, and land, and examine what this balance implies for the ability of India to achieve political ends with limited military force.

India’s substantial quantitative and qualitative naval superiority is unlikely to be an important factor in a short, limited war. India has twelve frigates to Pakistan’s six, an aging aircraft carrier and ten destroyers where Pakistan has none, twenty corvettes with anti-ship missiles compared to Pakistan’s six smaller missile boats, and fourteen diesel-electric submarines compared to Pakistan’s five (excluding Pakistan’s midget subs).<sup>6</sup> But the question is not which navy would win a maritime war, but rather whether the Indian Navy could beat its Pakistani counterpart so decisively and quickly that it might alter

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the strategic situation on land. Past India-Pakistan conflicts have been brief. Large-scale fighting lasted one month in 1965, two weeks in 1971, and two months in the 1999 Kargil conflict. As a result, the Indian Navy played a limited role in earlier Indo-Pakistani conflicts and this pattern seems likely to persist.

Most analyses do not account adequately for how difficult it would be for the navy to have a substantial impact in a short period of time. Establishing even a partial blockade takes time, and it takes even more time for that blockade to cause shortages on land that are noticeable. As the British strategist Julian Corbett noted in 1911, “it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow....”<sup>77</sup> Meanwhile, over the last decade, Pakistan has increased its ability to resist a blockade. In addition to the main commercial port of Karachi, Pakistan has opened up new ports further west in Ormara and Gwadar and built road infrastructure to distribute goods from those ports to Pakistan’s heartland. To close off these ports to neutral shipping could prove particularly difficult since Gwadar and the edge of Pakistani waters are very close to the Gulf of Oman, host to the international shipping lanes for vessels exiting the Persian Gulf. A loose blockade far from shore would minimize risks from Pakistan’s land-based countermeasures but also increase risks of creating a political incident with neutral vessels. Even if India were to be successful in establishing a blockade, new overland routes to China are likely to further protect Pakistan from strangulation from the sea. While the navy is not irrelevant, there are strong reasons to be skeptical that the naval balance has tilted in such a way as to affect strategic outcomes in a limited India-Pakistan conflict.

The air balance between India and Pakistan is also thought to heavily favor the larger and more technologically sophisticated Indian Air Force. While India has a qualitative and quantitative advantage, the air capabilities gap narrowed rather than widened in the last decade. The Pakistan Air Force has undergone substantial modernization since 2001, when Pakistan exited from a decade of US-imposed sanctions. With purchases from U.S., European, and Chinese vendors, Pakistan has both dramatically increased the number of modern fighter aircraft with beyond-visual-range capability as well as new airborne early warning and control aircraft. Meanwhile, India’s fighter modernization effort has been languid over the last decade. India’s largest fighter procurement effort—the purchase of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft—began in 2001 and has been slowed considerably by cumbersome defense procurement rules designed to avoid the appearance of corruption. While over the course of a prolonged conflict, there is little doubt that the Indian Air Force would win an air superiority battle, that battle would be hard fought and take time. The longer the fight for air supremacy, the longer it is before the Indian Air Force can focus on supporting ground forces in the event of substantial army-to-army clashes. More limited air strikes against “terrorist training camps” might be attractive to decision-makers in Delhi, but they are poor targets as the camps are likely to be empty following any large-scale terrorist attack on India. Further, such air strikes create the risk of tit-for-tat dynamics where Pakistan feels compelled to give back in kind to demonstrate an ability to protect its territory from India. If the Pakistan Air Force perceives that it cannot successfully use airpower in a reprisal raid following an Indian air strike, Pakistan may use conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles. India’s air and missile defenses would not be able to stop a missile attack and might not be able to prevent a Pakistani air strike—thus, breaking an escalatory spiral of dueling air or missile strikes would prove daunting.

The ground forces balance has received the most attention from outside observers, in large part because the Indian Army has publicized its efforts at doctrinal innovation, most often referred to under the “Cold Start” moniker. However, India’s ground superiority is unlikely to be sufficient to achieve a quick victory. After the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian Army was embarrassed by political criticisms that the mobilization to the Indo-Pakistani border took too long to complete.

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# What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like?

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The army worked to speed up mobilization timelines and allow for Indian Army actions against Pakistan prior to a cumbersome full-scale mobilization. The principal difficulty with limited ground options is that they prevent India from taking advantage of its main advantage: its larger ground forces. Simply put, if India chooses to employ only a portion of its army, Pakistan would choose to employ a larger portion of its own forces to stop the attack and perhaps open up other fronts on terrain favorable to Pakistan. Relatedly, because Pakistan's population centers are close the border, it is easier for the Pakistan Army to maintain most of its land forces near the border than it is for India to do likewise. The net result of both factors is that India may have difficulty mobilizing more quickly than Pakistan. Therefore, even a limited ground attack could quickly escalate to being a full-scale clash between armies, with all the incumbent risks.

The net result of this analysis is to conclude that India's limited military options against Pakistan are risky and uncertain. Pakistan has options to respond to limited Indian moves, making counter-escalation likely. At least in the near-term, Pakistan appears to have configured its forces in such a way as to deny India "victory on the cheap." Therefore, India might well have to fight a full-scale war that could destroy large segments of Pakistan's army to achieve its political aims, which would approach Pakistan's stated nuclear redlines. Such a conclusion should induce caution among Indian political elites who are considering military options to punish or coerce Pakistan in a future crisis. In the event of a future terrorist attack in India blamed on Pakistan, Indian leaders are likely to have few good options and outside observers should remain intensely concerned of the dangers of escalation between these two nuclear-armed states.

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- 2 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, *US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis*, report no. 57 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2006) and Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, *The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2012).
- 3 Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report by Landau Network-Centro Volta," *Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs* (January 14, 2002), <http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm>.
- 4 Walter Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security* 32, no. 2 (Winter 2007-2008): 158-90.
- 5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 239.
- 6 The most substantial role the Indian Navy has played in past conflicts was preventing West Pakistan from using sea routes to reinforce East Pakistan, a scenario unlikely to appear again since East Pakistan is now the independent state of Bangladesh.
- 7 Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, new ed. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.: 1918), 11-12.

# Iran's Foreign and Energy Policies over the Next 25 Years



*Abbas Maleki is a Robert E. Wilhelm fellow at CIS and associate professor of energy policy at Sharif University of Technology. He served as deputy foreign minister of Iran from 1986 to 1997.*

In a May 9 seminar on Iranian energy security and its intersection with Iranian foreign policy, Abbas Maleki, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran (1986-1997), said he expected nuclear energy to play a relatively small role in Iran's energy future. In fact, he suggested that if the United States were to drop its objections to Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology, Iranians would probably declare that they had no real interest in such technology anyway.

Only about two percent of Iran's total energy production comes from nuclear sources, Maleki, now Associate Professor of Energy Policy at Sharif University of Technology, Tehran and a Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at CIS, said. He added that the cost-benefit calculations for "expensive and old" nuclear technology, versus other renewable and non-renewable sources, are not favorable. Rather, Maleki sees the development of wind and solar power, and increased oil and natural gas production, as more promising avenues for the Iranian economy.

Why, then, does Iran continue to pursue nuclear technology? "This is a case of respect and pride for Iranians," Maleki said. He charged the US with upholding a double standard, allowing states such as India, Israel, and Pakistan to develop nuclear technology while sanctioning Iran for the same behavior. Because of this double standard, he said, Iranian leadership feels it must oppose American efforts.

On the other hand, Maleki categorically rejected the idea that Iran might soon develop a nuclear weapon. He noted that Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, has declared the pursuit of nuclear weapons to be contrary to Islam, and added, "When you are the leader of a country, you cannot say something now and change it tomorrow. Because of the public, you cannot lie." Maleki also argued that the development of nuclear weapons makes no strategic sense for Iran. Iran has plenty of conventional military capability to take on near potential adversaries such as Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, while a handful of nuclear bombs—the likely yield of an Iranian nuclear weapons program in the short term—would provide no match for the nuclear weapons capabilities of far potential adversaries such as China, Russia, or the United States, he said.

In discussing Iranian foreign policy more generally, Maleki argued that Iran should pursue a regionalist approach, increasing engagement both with near neighbors and the regional organizations that represent their interests. Such organizations include the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Shifting energy demand should motivate this push toward regionalism, Maleki said. Whereas traditionally the areas of the world with the most energy supply and the most energy demand have been different—central Eurasia versus Europe and North America, respectively—now both supply and demand are becoming more concentrated in Iran's immediate vicinity.

Specifically, Maleki said there are significant opportunities for bilateral trade in petroleum products with Iraq, given that most Iraqi and Iranian oil and gas sources lie in the border region between the two states. Iran could act as a key market and conduit for Iraqi oil, he said. Iraq's prospect as an oil producer is still in doubt, but Maleki claimed that if Iraq could manage to produce three million barrels per day—a conservative estimate—it would become the second-largest oil exporter in OPEC. Maleki also spoke of several initiatives to improve the transportation of oil and gas from Iran, through its neighbors, to customers in Europe. He showed the audience four international pipelines under development, three of which are planned to run through the Middle East (the fourth would run through the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia).

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### Turkey's New Global Activism

CIS organized a three-day workshop in Istanbul, April 12-14, to assess Turkey's new global role and its application of hard and soft power in its region. Hosted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the workshop brought together scholars and practitioners from Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, including leading Turkish intellectuals and officials. Along with CIS executive director John Tirman, the meeting was shaped by Professor Mario Zucconi (Princeton), Professor Kristin Fabbe (Claremont McKenna), who recently earned a PhD in political science from MIT, and Michael Meier of the Ebert Foundation. Presentations were also made in Ankara to the diplomatic corps, and will be forthcoming in Washington, DC, Brussels, and Berlin. The workshop prompted considerable coverage in Turkey, and the organizers expect further engagement.

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### Nuclear Security Fellows Program

With the support of the Stanton Foundation, the Security Studies Program has launched a Nuclear Security Fellows Program for junior faculty as well as pre-doctoral and post-doctoral scholars. The Nuclear Security Fellows Program seeks to stimulate the development of the next generation of thought leaders in nuclear security by supporting research that will advance policy-relevant understanding of the subject. Fellows are expected to produce policy-relevant research, including book manuscripts, draft articles, dissertations, chapters in edited volumes, or reports. Nuclear security is defined broadly to include nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, nuclear doctrine and force structure, nuclear energy as it relates to nuclear security, and other topics that involve nuclear security.

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### IUCIM and CIS Honor Sharon Stanton Russell

Sharon Stanton Russell, a mainstay of migration studies at MIT and the Inter-University Committee on International Migration, was honored with a IUCIM symposium and dinner on February 7 at CIS. Russell, who had a long association with the late CIS director Myron Weiner, a leading migration theorist, has been a leader of IUCIM for fifteen years. She has made major contributions to migration studies, including pioneering work on remittances for the World Bank. Among other works, she was co-editor with Weiner of *Demography and National Security*. Russell has also had long associations with the University of Sussex, the United Nations, and the National Academy of Sciences. The Feb 7 symposium featured presentations by six Committee members: Karen Jacobsen (Tufts), Nazli Choucri (MIT), Robert Lucas (BU), Peggy Levitt (Wellesley), John Harris (BU), and Luise Druke (Harvard Law School). Michael Teitelbaum, another collaborator on cutting edge research with Russell, led a number of accolades at the dinner.



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## Starr Forums

The Center's spring Starr Forums included: "Arab Spring and its Impact on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," with Leila Farsakh and Anat Biletski; "Revisiting Port Huron," with Tom Hayden and Noam Chomsky; "A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran," featuring Trita Parsi, Abbas Maleki, and Stephen Kinzer; and a photo exhibit "Libya: Armed Conflict and its Aftermath," displaying the works of war photographer Michael Brown.

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## MISTI adds MIT Korea and MIT Russia

Working with a network of leading companies and universities, MISTI connects students with select hands-on professional and research internships around the globe. The two newest country programs are MIT Korea and MIT Russia. To help make an international experience available to every MIT student, MISTI internships are all-expenses-paid.

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## SSP Wednesday Seminars

The Security Studies Program's lunchtime lectures included: Joby Warrick, *Washington Post*, on "Triple Agent: Lessons from the CIA's Disaster at Khost, Afghanistan"; Benjamin Runkle, House Armed Services Committee, on "Wanted Dead or Alive: Strategic Manhunts and US National Security"; and Jennifer Dixon, Harvard University, on "Changing the State's Story: Continuity and Change in Official Narratives of Dark Pasts."

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## CIS Audits the Economy, Iran, and Gay Rights in Africa

The Center continued with its *Audit of the Conventional Wisdom* video series featuring: "The Future of the Euro," with Marco Mazzucchelli, a visiting scholar at Sloan and David Singer, associate professor at the MIT Department of Political Science; Abbas Maleki, the Center's Wilhelm fellow, discussed "US-Iran Relations"; and Jackee Budesta Batanda, the Center's Neuffer fellow, on "Cutting Aid to Africa Won't Help Gay Rights."

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## Bustani Middle East Seminar

The Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar hosted two talks: "The North African 'Arab Spring': Days of Rage, Dreams of Trespass," with William Lawrence (Director, North Africa Program for International Crisis Group); and "Iran: Domestic Turmoil and Drumbeats of War," with Ali Banuazizi (Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Director of the Program of Islamic Civilization and Societies).

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## MISTI Global Seed Funds Competition

The 2011-2012 MISTI Global Seed Funds Competition awarded \$1,708,290 for seventy-one faculty research projects. The projects involve international collaboration and include undergraduate, graduate or postdoctoral student participation. The new grant process will open in May with an early fall deadline.

## People

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**Erin Baumgartner** has been promoted to Managing Director of the MIT-France Program.

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Visiting Fellow **Baktybek Beshimov** presented “The Rivalry of the US, Russia and China in Central Asia” at the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations conference on “Security and Diplomacy in Asia” in February. He spoke at Boston University on “Human Rights in Post-Soviet Central Asia.” In April, he spoke at Beloit College in April on “Post-9/11 Policies in Central Asia” and at Suffolk University on “The USA, China and Russia’s Competition and Cooperation in Central Asia after 9/11.” He was also interviewed for the *Boston Review*, the *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, and *The Boston Globe*.

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PhD candidate **Nathan Black** presented “The Spread of Violent Civil Conflict: Rare, State-Driven, and Preventable” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in San Diego. Nathan also accepted a postdoctoral fellowship at the Harvard University Center for the Environment for 2012-2014.

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In January, Associate Professor **Taylor Fravel** presented “China’s Changing Approach to the South China Sea” at the Department of State and “China’s Territorial Disputes: Past, Present, and Future” at the US-Japan Kanazawa Conference in Ishikawa, Japan. In February, he presented “China and Sudden Instability in North Korea: Interests, Priorities, and Likely Responses” at the United States Institute of Peace. This winter, he also presented “From Assertiveness to Moderation: Explaining China’s Behavior in the South China Sea” at Harvard’s Kennedy School and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. In March, he was a witness at the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on “Investigating the Chinese Threat, Part One: Military and Economic Aggression” and in April, he presented “Explaining the Evolution of China’s Military Strategy” at the International Studies Association Annual Conference.

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**Caroline Fickett**, MISTI Communications Assistant, received a 2012 SHASS Infinite Mile Award for her outstanding achievements.

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**Alicia Goldstein** has been promoted to Managing Director of the MIT-Spain program. Barry Lynn on the radio show “Culture Shocks.”

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Security Studies Program Senior Advisor **Jeanne Guillemin**’s book, *American Anthrax*, was selected as a 2012 “Must-Read” by the Massachusetts Center for the Book. Her book was also reviewed in *The FASEB Journal* and *Brandeis Magazine*.

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**Kersti Larsdotter** has joined SSP as a research scholar with support from the Ryochi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund. 21st Century.”

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**Lynne Levine** has been promoted to Administrative Assistant II in recognition of the increased complexity of her job and was awarded a 2012 SHASS Infinite Mile Award for her outstanding achievements.

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The Class of 1922 Professor of Political Science and Management and Head of the MIT Political Science Department **Richard Locke**’s work was featured in “When the Jobs Inspector Calls” in *The Economist*.

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**Susan Luvisi** joined CIS as an administrative assistant for the MISTI Global Seed Funds program and other MISTI programs.

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Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow **Abbas Maleki** served as a discussant at the Starr Forum “A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran.”

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Ford International Professor of Political Science **Ben Ross Schneider** gave a speech entitled “Hierarchical Capitalism: Business, Labor, and the Challenge of Equitable Development in Latin America” at the World Bank in Washington, DC, in May and at the IPEA in Brasília in June.

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**Roger Petersen**, the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science, has been awarded the ASN (Association for the Study of Nationalities) 2012 Joseph Rothschild Prize for his book, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*.

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PhD Candidate **Miranda Priebe** was awarded a predoctoral fellowship with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. She was also selected as a Tobin Project National Security Fellow.

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PhD Candidate **Kai Quek** presented “Discontinuities in China’s Signaling Behavior upon Its Decision For War” and “Nuclear Proliferation and the Risk of Nuclear War: Experimental Tests” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention and the Midwest Political Science Association National Conference. He presented these papers and “Using Mechanical Turk as a Subject Pool in Developing Countries” (with Adam Berinsky and Michael Sances) at MPSA.

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In February, Associate Professor of Law and Development **Balakrishnan Rajagopal** gave a lecture on “Beyond ‘Rights’ and ‘Development’ for tackling the Sanitation Challenge: Lessons from Gujarat, India” at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School. In March, he spoke at a conference on “Law: Between Theory and Critique” in Paris. He delivered the annual Hansen/Hostler Distinguished Lecture on Global Justice at San Diego State University and participated on a panel, “Effectuating Socio-Economic Rights in India” at Yale Law School in April. He was also a presenter and plenary speaker at the “Conference on the 20th Anniversary of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,” University of Indiana Law School at Bloomington.

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Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Studies **Richard Samuels** has spent his leave writing a book on the political impact and policy implications of Japan’s March 2011 catastrophes in Japan and as a Visiting Professor at LUISS in Rome.

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Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning **Bishwapriya Sanyal** received the Distinguished Alumni award from Indian Institute of Technology. He also received a five year grant from the Hubert Humphrey Fellowship Program (a Fulbright exchange program) to host mid-career urban planners at MIT.



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# EndNotes

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**Carol R. Saivetz**, Research Affiliate in the Security Studies Program, spoke at a State Department conference about Russian foreign policy toward Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

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In November, Ford International Professor of Political Science **Ben Ross Schneider** presented “Business Groups, the State, and Industrial Policy” at the Harvard Kennedy School. In December, he presented “Business Groups, Politics, and the State in Latin America” at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In January, he presented “New and Old Developmental States in Brazil” at the Workshop on Democracy and Development Policy, IPEA, Brasilia. In February, he presented “Hierarchical Capitalism: Business, Labor, and the Challenge of Equitable Development in Latin America” at Tulane University and Princeton University.

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PhD Candidate **Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin** was awarded a predoctoral fellowship at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and an O’Donnell grant from the Scowcroft Institute at Texas A&M University. He was also selected as a Tobin Project National Security Fellow.

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Associate Professor of Political Science **David Andrew Singer** presented a working paper on banking crises at faculty seminars at the London School of Economics and Washington University in St. Louis. He will present chapters from his book manuscript “Migration and Global Finance” at Yale University in June.

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**Sarah Jane Vaughan** has been promoted to Administrative Assistant II in recognition of the increased complexity of her job.

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In April, Security Studies Program Research Associate **Jim Walsh** gave a lecture “My 5 Dinners with Ahmadinejad: Iran, Nuclear Weapons, the Middle East” at MIT.

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In April, PhD Candidate **David Weinberg** presented his paper “Pharaoh’s Lament: Civil-Military Relations and the Fall of Egypt’s Mubarak Regime” at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, in San Diego, California.

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## *Published*

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**Nazli Choucri**, Professor of Political Science

“Lost in Cyberspace: Harnessing the Internet, International Relations, and Global Security,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 68(2), pp. 70–77 with Daniel Goldsmith.

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**Jerome Klassen**, Postdoctoral Fellow

“Methods of Empire: Nation-building, Development and War in Afghanistan,” in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, eds, *Empire’s Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

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**Willa Michener**, CIS Research Affiliate

"The Individual Psychology of Group Hate" will appear in the Fall 2012 issue of *The Journal of Hate Studies*.

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**Melissa Nobles**, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science

Room for Debate "Brazil's Racial Identity Challenge" *New York Times*.

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**Andrew Radin**, PhD candidate

"Enlisting Islam for an Effective Afghan Police," *Survival*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April-May 2012), 113-128 with Austin Long.

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**Ben Ross Schneider**, Ford International Professor of Political Science

"Business Politics in Latin America: Investigating Structure, Preferences, and Influence" in Peter Kingstone and Deborah Yashar, eds., *Handbook of Latin American Politics* (London: Routledge, 2012) (with Sebastian Karcher).

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**Richard Samuels**, Ford International Professor of Political Science

Ford International Professor of Political Science Richard Samuels, "Japan's Roiling Struggle Forward," *Boston Globe*, March 10, 2012.

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**Bishwapriya Sanyal**, Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning

ed., *Planning Ideas that Matter: Sustainability, Livability, Territoriality, and Governance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Forthcoming August 2012) with Lawrence J. Vale and Christina D. Rosan.

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**Carol R. Saivetz**, Security Studies Program Research Affiliate

"Playing to Lose? Russia and the 'Arab Spring'," *Problems of Post-Communism*, January 2012 (with Stephen Blank).w York," *cnn.com*, September 26, 2011.

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**John Tirman**, CIS Principal Research Scientist and Executive Director

"The Forgotten Wages of War," *New York Times*, January 3, 2012, A23., No. 3, October 2011.

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**Elizabeth Wood**, Professor of History

"Russia's anti-Putin Protests are more than just a Generational Temper Tantrum," *Boston.com*, January 18, 2012.

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# Iran's Foreign & Energy Policies

*continued from page 15*

Regionalism would not come without its drawbacks, Maleki acknowledged. Chief among them would be some loss of sovereignty and some loss of cultural distinctness, he said. However, he sees the potential benefits outweighing the potential costs, particularly if Iran pursues a policy of “self-reliance” in parallel with its pursuit of regionalism.

Maleki said self-reliance requires, among other things, increasing Iranian oil production from four million barrels per day to 7.5 million barrels per day, improving Iran's indigenous capacity to train petroleum engineers and similar professionals, building up Iran's private sector as a way of skirting international sanctions on importing oil and gas from Iranian state-owned enterprises, and resolving international territorial disputes over the oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea in a manner that provides Iran with an alternative, albeit modest, supply source. Iran has just one percent of the world's population but 10 percent of its proven oil reserves, and 16 percent of its proven gas reserves, he said. So there is certainly the potential for self-reliance, but challenges remain.

The tense relationship between Iran and the US will create particular challenges for these development efforts, Maleki said. He noted that out of Iran's 15 neighbors, 12 have US troops deployed there. Despite Iran's geographic distance from the US, he said, “When you are surrounded by the American troops, you cannot think easily about development, investment, or infrastructure.”

On another recent point of tension in US-Iranian relations, Maleki argued that Iran had no interest in closing the Strait of Hormuz. The strait, which carries about 16.5 million barrels per day of oil, is Iran's key naval gateway to the outside world, he said.

*Nathan Black served as rapporteur for this talk.*

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