




précis

n. a concise summary of essential points, statements, or facts

précis Interviews Ben Ross Schneider

Ben Ross Schneider is a professor of political science at MIT and co-directs MIT Brazil, which is part of the Center's MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI). He also co-directs the Interdisciplinary Workshop on Institutions and Development (IWID), and the Harvard-MIT Workshop on the Political Economy of Development in Brazil.

He discusses with *précis* opportunities for research-related activities in Brazil, his current and future research agenda on Latin America, and the upcoming presidential elections in Brazil.




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Buying National Security

by Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams

National security budgets are the most dependable reflection of US security policy. Seeing things through the lens of the budget can help decision-makers and ordinary citizens discern the genuine priorities of national leaders from the oftentimes illusory ones portrayed in rhetoric.



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Not in Your Backyard

by Keren Fraiman

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP's) failed attempt to destroy a commercial airliner on Christmas Day has thrust Yemen back into the world spotlight as an important base for jihadist terrorist activity.



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MISTI's Gercik Wins Award

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Christian Caryl, an editor at *Foreign Policy* and *Newsweek*; George Gilboy, chief representative, China, for Woodside Energy Ltd. of Australia; and Robert Madsen, an expert on East Asian and global politics and economics.

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Funding for Global Studies

Funding opportunities for MIT students to do work on global issues are offered by or facilitated through the Center. Recent awards went to students doing work in Brazil, China, and Ethiopia.

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Ben Ross Schneider

Professor of Political Science, MIT
Co-Director, MIT Brazil Program



Ben Ross Schneider is a professor of political science in the Department of Political Science at MIT and co-directs the MIT Brazil Program of the Center's MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI). In addition, he co-directs the Interdisciplinary Workshop on Institutions and Development (IWID), and the Harvard-MIT Workshop on the Political Economy of Development in Brazil.

précis: In 2008, you joined MIT as a professor of political science, after teaching at Northwestern and Princeton. What primarily attracted you to MIT?

BRS: What attracted me to MIT was that it had a really great group of faculty with major strengths across my main areas of research and teaching—comparative politics, political economy and development. These strengths are not just in the political science department, but also in other departments on campus, such as MIT's Sloan School of Management and the Department of Urban Studies and Planning.

précis: You were recently named co-director of the MIT Brazil Program. How would you characterize the general mission of the program? What are some of the program's main activities?

BRS: Co-directing the MIT Brazil Program with Richard Locke is a wonderful opportunity. The program started in the summer of 2009, with critical start-up support from Lawrence Fish, and has quickly built up into a range of related activities. The core of the program is the Center's MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) internship program, which matches students with internship opportunities in Brazil. We've also added Portuguese language instruction, which MIT has never had before, and a new course I created on the political economy of development and technology in Brazil and Mexico. Beyond the MISTI part of the program, we're fortunate to have additional funding that allows us to support a number of research activities. For example, we organize an ongoing Harvard-MIT Workshop on the Political Economy of Development in Brazil. This faculty and graduate student workshop meets once or twice a month

usually with visiting Brazilian scholars or local Brazilianists. In addition, we are hosting a big conference at MIT April 14-15, 2011, which will draw leading academics, government figures and business leaders from Brazil. We expect the conference to focus on areas where we think there is the greatest synergy between innovative research in Brazil and here at MIT, such as energy, traditional as well as biofuels and alternative sources, environment and global climate change, emerging multinationals coming out of Brazil, and innovation in policy and public-private partnerships in areas like AIDS policy and social welfare programs.

précis: What types of opportunities does the program provide for MIT researchers and scholars?

BRS: We have two opportunities for MIT researchers and scholars to encourage them to engage more in research-related activities in Brazil. One opportunity is travel grants for dissertation students to go to Brazil to do exploratory research. We will also be participating in MISTI global seed funds, which will have a special Brazil component involving partnerships between Brazilian researchers and counterparts at MIT.

précis: Your current research agenda revolves around two areas: 1) market reforms in education in Latin America and 2) distinct institutional foundations of capitalist development in Latin America with particular attention to corporate governance, foreign investment, and worker training. Could you talk a little about the origins of this research and some of the themes of your current work?

BRS: My overarching interest is in examining the political and institutional arrangements that either impede

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or promote development in the region. Within this general interest, I have been researching a number of different specific topics. One of those that I think is particularly crucial in Latin America is education. Generally speaking, despite recent advances, the region still lags in terms of educational attainment, educational quality, and performance on international tests. To date, I've been doing most of my research on education in Chile, where recent governments have invested a great deal in education and enacted significant innovations in education policy.

The bulk of my other research is on what, by way of shorthand, I call hierarchical capitalism in Latin America. The focus of this research is on the largest countries in the region: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. For example, the prominence of large, family-owned, diversified business groups give a distinctive form to the large firms within the region. These are the crucial institutions of the private sector that are very different in Latin America than what you see in most developed democracies. And this is one of the areas where hierarchy comes in, as most of the large firms in the region are either owned by these business groups or are subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations, so they are all hierarchically controlled. One of the questions about these groups is how innovative are they. Some of them are quite well-managed and innovative, but many of them are not. So, the question is—what is impeding those that are not and what is driving others to be more dynamic? A related question is what is happening in the labor markets and what the demands of these large firms for skills are. Generally speaking, the demand for high-skilled labor has been low, although this has been changing recently in some of the more successful cases—Brazil and Chile, in particular.

précis: In a 2009 article, “Hierarchical Market Economies and Varieties of Capitalism in Latin America,” in the *Journal of Latin American Studies*, you write that “another enduring characteristic of corporate governance in Latin America is family ownership and

management. In the early 2000s, over 90 percent of 33 of the largest groups in Latin America were family-owned and -managed.” What is the impact of this on corporate governance in Latin America? Is this a positive or negative phenomenon?

BRS: The jury is still out on this because you have examples of very well-run and highly innovative family firms and then you have some basket cases. Even researchers in business schools who really focus on this issue are of two minds on the matter. On the one hand, these family firms provide continuity in management and ownership, a long-term perspective, a deep stake in the firm, and a strong commitment to make the firm work. In addition, if you have a family-owned firm, managed by several generations, it can make for a close and cohesive management knit together with strong bonds of trust, which can be a major asset in weakly institutionalized environments. So, in that sense, family control is positive. However, on the negative side, if you want the best management that money can buy you may want to look outside your own gene pool. Also, the transition from one generation to the next is rarely simple or easy. Many firms go through severe crises during these generational transitions.

précis: In another recent publication, “Big Business in Brazil: Leveraging Natural Endowments and State Support for International Expansion,” in Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, ed., *Brazil as an Emerging Economic Superpower* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009), you write, “By one study, no country in Latin America spends more than \$10 per capita on R&D, compared with more than \$200 per capita for countries like South Korea, Australia, and Ireland.” What do you think drives these differences? How does one go about changing this?

BRS: Yes, the differences are striking. Part of the absolute difference is due to the level of development. Latin America is spending less because it is poorer. But, even if you look at R&D in terms of percentage of GDP, the regional average

is below one percent—with Brazil and Chile a bit above—but still less than half of the average for developed democracies and one-third of levels in some East Asian economies. So, it is lower however you calculate it. When you break it down, in most countries of the region most of the R&D is funded or done by the government and what is really missing is large-scale private investment in R&D. Again, there are some bright spots in Chile and Brazil in particular, where you see a great deal more investment and innovation in the last five years, but there is still a long way to go. And the question is, given the commodity driven growth of the last decade, how much R&D and innovation can be done in these areas which have traditionally been considered low-tech. There are some positive signs that there are new areas of innovation, such as biofuels, but it is not yet showing up as a major shift in overall private investment in R&D.

précis: How and when did you become interested in your current areas of research? How did you become interested in political economy and Latin America?

BRS: It is a long story, but I actually first became interested in Latin America during my junior year studying abroad in Paris. For my dissertation, I spent two and a half years in Brazil doing research. Since then, my core research concerns have been what is holding back development in the region and specifically what are the political and institutional constraints on development. My research focus has been within that broad umbrella, but has changed over time. My first book analyzed industrial policy and the variable performance of state-owned enterprises. I next turned to examine business politics, business-government relations, and collective action in business associations.

précis: One of the main advantages of the MIT political science department and CIS is the emphasis on links between academic research and policy. What are some of the direct policy implications of the research you've discussed?

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One of the main implications of my recent research is that the policy debate should focus more on the crucial challenge of creating more high skill, high wage jobs. One of the key metrics we should be using to assess policies is whether or not they are generating high-quality jobs, which has not been a top concern at most multilateral development agencies. This policy engagement is one of the other things that attracted me to MIT. In the past couple of years I have been working more with development agencies at the United Nations, the World Bank, and especially the Inter-American Bank Development on various issues revolving around policy making and business-government relations.

précis: *What are some of your plans for future projects? Are there issue areas or projects in your mind that you have not started working on, but that you'd like to begin in the upcoming year?*

BRS: At this stage, I am mostly focused on finishing up the work I've been doing on corporate governance, labor markets, skills, and hierarchical capitalism, and tying them together in a series of articles or possibly a book. Beyond that, on the more distant horizon, there are a couple of things that would be interesting to pursue. One idea would be a project on a new set of technology and innovation policies adopted recently by some governments in Latin America. The question would be what makes these policies work and whether they have promoted, as policy makers hoped, novel forms of business-government collaboration. Another idea would be more theoretical, to push the debate on institutions and development. Most recent research has focused on a thin, narrow conception of institutions conceived as just the rules of the game, such as property rights, regulatory regimes, and so forth. This approach usually takes organizations as given. So, I think there is a great deal to be gained by

problematizing organizations and shifting attention more to in depth micro-level research on organizations like public agencies, private corporations, unions, NGOs, and other civil associations.

précis: *Any closing comments on the upcoming World Cup or elections in Brazil?*

BRS: Well, I'm not going to risk a prediction on who is going to win the World Cup, but Brazilians are usually optimistic going into it. As for the elections this fall, what is so striking is that both of the front-running candidates are mainstream and have both migrated towards the center left. It will be an exciting campaign, but not because there are any significant policy differences between the two. Whoever wins, there is going to be a lot of continuity from the current Lula government. Both candidates have great strengths, so without predicting who is going to win, I think the outcome will be positive. ■

MISTI's Global Seed Funds <http://web.mit.edu/misti/faculty/seed.html>

MISTI offers seed funds to help MIT faculty and researchers launch early-stage international projects and collaboration. Applicants are encouraged to involve MIT students—both undergraduate and graduate—in their projects.

MISTI Global Seed Funds (GSF) is open to all MIT faculty and members of the research staff with principal investigator privileges.* This includes faculty, principal research scientists and senior research scientists.

MIT students and postdocs are encouraged to participate in projects but may not apply directly for funding. MIT students funded to participate will be expected to attend country-specific training through MISTI.

MISTI GSF includes a general pool for projects in any location and several country-specific funds supported by outside donors.

The MISTI GSF program was initiated through funding from the Office of the Provost to enhance the internationalization of MIT research and education.

"By enabling MIT students to participate in faculty-led international projects, we hope to increase opportunities for hands-on, global learning and connection to innovation around the world," said Richard Samuels, director of the Center for International Studies.

MIT's largest international program, MISTI is a pioneer in applied international studies. Since 1994, the program has placed over 3,000 MIT students in professional internships and research positions with its network of leading companies, universities, research institutes and NGOs around the world. MISTI currently operates in Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico and Spain. The program is a part of the Center for International Studies.

**An exception: The MIT-India/IFMR Trust Seed Fund is also open to lecturers.*

MISTI's Patricia Gercik Receives MIT Excellence Award

“Every successful project and institution requires such a visionary. She has been ours,” says Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science, director of the Center for International Studies, and founding director of the MIT Japan Program.”

Patricia Gercik, associate director of the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) and managing director of the MIT Japan Program, received an MIT Excellence Award in the category of “Bringing Out the Best: Everyday Leadership throughout MIT.”

As associate director of MISTI, Gercik supervises the high functioning work of ten different country program managers. As managing director of the MIT Japan Program, Gercik teaches students about Japan, supervises their placement in Japanese internships, cultivates relationships with firms and institutions on both sides of the Pacific, raises funds, and manages relationships with the Japanese community.



Photo by Jon Sachs, jonsachs.com

Gercik joined MIT more than 25 years ago to help develop what was then a fledgling program in Japanese studies at MIT. That program—now known as MIT Japan—marks the genesis of applied international studies at MIT and is a cornerstone of the ten (and growing) country programs of MISTI. MISTI is today the nation's largest and most successful programs of applied international studies.

“Pat is an aggressive and successful fundraiser in the corporate world; a dedicated mentor to students and staff; and an imaginative architect for each next phase of program development. Every successful project and institution requires such a visionary. She has been ours,” says Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science, director of the Center for International Studies, and founding director of the MIT Japan Program.

Suzanne Berger, Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science and director of MISTI, adds, “Pat has a great capacity to bring intuition together with sharp observation and analysis in problem solving. I have never met anyone with the same combination of realism and toughness in judgment together with kindness and compassion in approach.”

Gercik's reach extends far beyond MIT. She has been a national leader in coordinating efforts on campuses from Massachusetts to California to stimulate more and better understanding about Japan and international studies. She has been the interface between MISTI and the US government, from the National Science Foundation to the Pentagon. To that end, she authored a book, *On Track with the Japanese*, which has become required reading for the executives of many firms.

Born to a British mother and a Russian father who relocated to Kobe, Japan, in the 1930s, Gercik lived a Japanese childhood. She has vivid memories of “confronting” U.S. soldiers during the Occupation and wandering through the black markets of a reconstructing Tokyo; she recently wrote a novel about this experience. “Then, as now, she had a remarkable sense of how to understand human behavior—and how to explain it in ways that de-mystify,” says Samuels. ■


Buying National Security

Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams



Cindy Williams, principal research scientist, Security Studies Program

*Williams' recent book, **Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for its Global Role and Safety at Home**, was co-authored with Gordon Adams, a professor of international affairs at the School of International Service at American University and a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. The essay is an excerpt from the book and was reprinted with permission from Routledge.*



US policy makers on both sides of the political aisle emphasize the importance of employing a wide range of domestic and international tools—including defense, diplomacy and public diplomacy, foreign assistance, intelligence, and homeland security—to make the country secure and advance its international interests and policies. During the past decade, the United States has increased funding in all of those areas. Including the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined spending for national security, including national defense, international affairs, and homeland security, was more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars in fiscal year (FY) 2009, about 80 percent more in real terms than in FY 2001.

Spending for national security constitutes nearly 20 percent of total federal outlays and more than five percent of US gross domestic product. The Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) account for most of the total. Homeland security activities are widely dispersed across the federal government, however, so nearly every department and independent agency has some share of the national security total.

Money is Policy

National security budgets are the most dependable reflection of US security policy. Seeing things through the lens of the budget can help decision-makers and ordinary citizens discern the genuine priorities of national leaders from the oftentimes illusory ones portrayed in rhetoric. For example, in speeches and strategy documents, Republican and Democratic leaders often say that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the prospect of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists are among the greatest threats facing the United States. Yet only two-tenths of one percent of national security spending goes toward helping other governments prevent the dispersal or theft of nuclear materials or weapons, and an even smaller share goes toward inspecting US-bound shipping containers for nuclear materials. The Department of Energy spends nearly twice as much annually on new earth penetrating and low-yield nuclear weapons as on securing Russian fissile material.

In another example, policymakers sometimes argue that the United States is committed to development assistance that funds development for its own sake, not because such assistance is connected to vital national interests. At the same time, the budget reveals that the fastest growing bilateral assistance program is one that links assistance to the success of combat missions executed by forward-deployed US troops. The disjunction between rhetoric and budgets often reflects an underlying contradiction between the talk and the real priorities.

As with any area of the federal budget, decisions about how much money to spend on security and foreign affairs as a whole or on any single activity of national security result from a complex mix of public and elite perceptions of security interests, domestic politics, and institutional forces. The choices of priorities to emphasize, programs to pursue, and levels of spending can depend strongly on the preferences and abilities of individual leaders in federal departments and agencies, in the White House, and in Congress. They also depend on the machinery each of those institutions has created to bring information to those leaders and help them make choices about which programs and activities to pursue and how to divide resources among them. This book focuses on that machinery.

That machinery is in flux. Arrangements for strategic planning, resource allocation, and budgeting within federal departments, in the White House, and in Congress have undergone substantial changes during the past decade. Scholars, think tanks, and multiple committees and commissions have tabled numerous proposals for additional reforms. In this book, we concentrate on how things stand today and offer only a glimpse into how things may change in the coming years.

The book focuses on the breadth of the US government's structures and processes for national security planning and resource allocation. While there are some excellent studies of the topic for national defense, there are none for international affairs or homeland security. Nor is there a literature on the treatment of budgets in the interagency process, or one that links the executive branch to the Congress across the range of national security resource planning. This study is rooted in the proposition that all the tools of national security policymaking ought to be considered together, if policymakers are right that we need to use them in synergy.

Planning and Budgeting for International Affairs

Until recently, there was no central coordination of strategic planning or budgeting for the International Affairs category. The State Department, USAID, the Department of the Treasury, the Export-Import Bank, and the many other international agencies each prepared its own budget plan and submitted it directly to the White House. Even within the State Department, budget planning between foreign assistance programs and operations was uncoordinated. Moreover, the International Affairs agencies generally lacked formal mechanisms for long-term strategic planning or goal setting.

That has begun to change during the past decade and a half. State has established a strategic planning process for foreign assistance and has begun to connect these programs to its operational budgeting. The department increasingly asserts control over budgets for economic and humanitarian assistance and public diplomacy.

At the same time, however, the International Affairs arena has grown even more dispersed. With the creation of the new Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2002, there are now at least five distinct foreign assistance programs in the executive branch: Economic Support Funds (State), Development Assistance (USAID), Millennium Challenge Corporation, international development bank funds (Treasury), and Foreign Military Financing (State and Defense). Coordination of strategy and budgets among these programs or with the foreign policy goals articulated by the State Department or the White House almost never happens.

The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community

The most widely studied and arguably the most coherent strategic planning and resource system within the executive branch is that of the DOD. Even in that department, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process is in flux. Initially designed during the 1960s to strengthen centralized control of the department by the Secretary of Defense, the process as practiced today emphasizes and encourages collaboration among the services and other stakeholders. Rather than helping a Secretary to set and enforce priorities, critics charge that instead it now helps the department's components reinforce the status quo. Big decisions, such as those made during the military drawdown of the 1990s about what forces to cut and which systems to cancel, are often made outside of the formal process. Nobody seems happy with the system, and the Obama administration appears poised to undo some of the most recent changes.

The lion's share of the intelligence budget, including that of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is funded through the DOD, and the DOD plays a dominant role in planning and resource allocation for intelligence programs and activities. Nevertheless, 16 separate agencies and offices within the intelligence community collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The missions and responsibilities of these organizations frequently overlap, leading to complex management, planning, and budgetary challenges.

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Buying National Security

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“Setting priorities between guns and butter, and among the competing demands of national security, will be critically important to the nation’s future. Federal arrangements for strategic planning and resource allocation for national security, across all the instruments of American security and statecraft, will be an important determinant of how well that is done.”

Beginning with the creation of the CIA in 1947, national leaders have worked to organize the intelligence institutions and their budgeting in a more centralized and coordinated way. Those efforts culminated in the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004. Turf struggles among the agencies continue, however, and it remains unclear whether the new ODNI architecture will succeed in improving the coherence of planning and budgeting across the intelligence community.

Planning and Resource Allocation for Homeland Security

In January 2003, the Bush administration drew 22 disparate agencies and some 170,000 employees into the new DHS. Even so, DHS in FY 2009 spends only about half of the federal homeland security budget. Another one-quarter of the homeland security budget goes to the DOD, and the remainder is spread among nearly all of the other departments and independent agencies of government.

Proponents of establishing the DHS believed that a single department under a single cabinet secretary would be able to achieve what the White House Office of Homeland Security could not: unity of effort across the bulk of federal activities related to domestic security. The most important engine of such unity would be the control of the budget that the new Secretary of Homeland Security would enjoy.

To establish control, the department’s early leaders created a PPBE modeled loosely on the one in operation within DOD. Other departments with large roles in homeland security also took steps to consolidate or at least coordinate their internal planning and budgeting for the prevention of terrorist attacks, protection of people and infrastructure within the United States, and preparations to handle domestic emergencies should they arise.

The effectiveness of the new systems in forging unity of effort is not yet obvious. Within DHS, the components generally continue to set their own agendas. Their shares of the DHS budget are not significantly different from what they were before the department was created, suggesting that strategic priorities have not been set or enforced. Coordination of planning and budgets across departments also appears weak, even in important areas like biological defense.

Resource Planning in the White House

With so many executive branch agencies involved in national security, the coordination of planning and budgeting falls to the White House. Two organizations within the Executive Office of the President bear most of the responsibility: the National Security Council (NSC) (which now includes the Homeland Security Council) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The NSC coordinates national security strategy, advises the president on national security issues, oversees policy implementation through the interagency process, and integrates the White House response to national security crises. The NSC does not have a formal role in the federal budget process, but nearly every policy decision made in the NSC framework has resource implications.

OMB is the manager of executive branch budget processes. The organization sets requirements for the preparation and submission of budgets by all federal departments and agencies. Each year, it provides each agency with fiscal guidance that determines the size of the annual budget under consideration and constrains the agency’s plans for future years. It works with the agencies to ensure that programs are linked to and consistent with the president’s priorities. Increasingly in recent years, OMB also helps agencies to measure progress toward concrete outcomes, in an effort to improve the integration between budgets and performance. Arrangements in both organizations are in flux, and interagency processes aimed at bringing coherence to the planning and resource allocation of the agencies involved in national security are still relatively immature.

Resource Allocation and Budgeting in Congress

Congress was instrumental in the security-related reorganizations and process reforms of the executive branch after 9/11. Yet one of the most striking features of federal resource allocation and budgeting for security and foreign engagement is the continued absence of a unified approach within the legislative body itself. In recent years, the House established a Homeland Security Committee. The Senate renamed its Governmental Affairs Committee as the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and widened its jurisdiction to include some elements of homeland security. The Appropriations Committees in each chamber also established new subcommittees for homeland security and consolidated the subcommittees and appropriations within the International Affairs function.

Nevertheless, the responsibility for resource allocation and budgeting for national security remains divided among numerous committees and subcommittees. Several authorizing committees share jurisdiction for various elements of DHS, and even more get involved in the programs and budgets of other departments with roles in homeland security. Getting to a unified approach is probably not in the cards. But understanding how the system works in Congress can help one see how budgets for national security are ultimately made.

The Politics of National Security Budgeting

This book focuses on the machinery of planning, resource allocation, and budgeting in the executive branch and Congress. In reality, budgets are shaped by a variety of forces. These include party politics, the tug of war between Congress and the executive branch, the bureaucratic interests and power of individual departments and agencies, and the abilities and preferences of individual leaders.

No simple formula can tell leaders how much the United States should spend on national security or how that spending should be allocated among departments and programs. The United States wants and needs a strong military and intelligence apparatus, vigorous civilian international engagement, and prudent homeland security. Achieving US objectives on the world stage and providing for security in the future will require continued substantial investment in all of those areas. Nevertheless, US resources are finite. The nation's current financial and economic woes will likely spark a tightening of the belt in every area of federal spending. Fiscal problems related to rising health care costs and the eligibility for retirement of large numbers of baby boomers make continued growth of national security budgets unlikely.

Setting priorities between guns and butter, and among the competing demands of national security, will be critically important to the nation's future. Federal arrangements for strategic planning and resource allocation for national security, across all the instruments of American security and statecraft, will be an important determinant of how well that is done. ■

CIS Audits the Defense Budget

The Center's *Audit of the Conventional Wisdom* series challenges the wisdom behind the current defense budget—the largest since World War II. Is it a rational response to the threats and the dangers that the United States faces—or not?

Watch the video (<http://techtv.mit.edu/videos/6075>) featuring Benjamin Friedman, a Ph.D. student at the MIT Department of Political Science, member of the Center's Security Studies Program, and a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute.



Benjamin Friedman

Meet the Senior Fellows



Christian Caryl is a contributing editor at *Foreign Policy*, where he writes a weekly column (“Reality Check”), and at *Newsweek*. He is a regular contributor to *The New York Review of Books*. He spent the spring of 2010 as professor at the University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Centre and is currently writing a book about global politics at the end of the 1970s. From 2004 to March 2009 he served as the head of the Northeast Asia Bureau of *Newsweek*, based in Tokyo. Before that, from 2000 to 2004, Caryl served as *Newsweek*’s Moscow Bureau Chief. After 9/11 he carried out numerous assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of *Newsweek*’s reporting on the war on terror. Earlier he served as Moscow bureau chief for *U.S. News & World Report* starting in July 1997. Before moving to Moscow, Caryl spent 13 years as a freelance journalist in Germany, where he contributed to publications including *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New Republic*, *The Spectator* and *Der Spiegel*. He was a 1999 finalist in the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists Award for Outstanding Investigative Reporting. In his journalistic career he has reported from 37 countries. A 1984 graduate of Yale College, he speaks Russian and German.



George J. Gilboy is chief representative, China, for Woodside Energy Ltd. of Australia. Before joining Woodside in 2005, he was the head of Strategy and Planning for Shell Gas & Power in China. Prior to joining Shell, he established the China office and consulting practice for Cambridge Energy Research Associates. He has been living and working in Beijing since 1995. His publications have appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, *The National Interest*, *Current History*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *Bungei Shunju* (Japanese: Literature Salon), *Er Shi Yi Shi Ji Shang Ye Ping Lun* (Chinese: 21st Century Business Review), and *Jingji Yanjiu* (Chinese: Economic Research). He is the co-author of a forthcoming book with Eric Heginbotham, *Comparing Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Jackals From The Same Hill?* Gilboy is a 2008-2010 Public Intellectuals Program Fellow at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a B.A. in political science from Boston College.



Robert Madsen works on East Asian and global politics and economics. He is also an advisor on China and Japan for a prominent macroeconomic hedge fund; a member of the Executive Council at Unison Capital, one of Japan’s premier private equity groups; and a consultant to a “super-major” oil company on such topics as the global financial crisis, Chinese economics, and relations between East Asia and the Middle East. Over the last year he additionally worked as senior advisor and economist for a fund-of-funds that focused on investments in East and Southeast Asia. Since 1997, Madsen has written the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Japan Country Reports and contributed occasionally to that company’s analysis of China and broader East Asia. He consults regularly for a range of government agencies, including in recent years two economics ministries, a foreign ministry and a central bank. Before joining MIT in 2004, he was a fellow at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center, Asia Strategist at Soros Private Funds Management, and an advisor to the Robert M. Bass Group on its investments in Japanese real estate. Still earlier, he worked at McKinsey & Company as a management consultant, focusing on financial institutions and international commerce. He graduated from Harvard University’s Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations and then entered Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, where he studied under the faculty of International Relations and earned a master’s degree, with distinction, and a doctorate. He also holds a J.D., with distinction, from Stanford Law School and is a member of the California State Bar. Having spent over ten years abroad, he is fluent in Japanese and Mandarin Chinese.

Not in Your Backyard:

Understanding State Action Against Violent Non-State Actors

by Keren Fraiman



Keren Fraiman is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at MIT and a member of the Center's Security Studies Program. Her dissertation research focuses on coercion and violent non-state actors.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP's) failed attempt to destroy a commercial airliner on Christmas Day has thrust Yemen back into the world spotlight as an important base for jihadist terrorist activity. The bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, apparently received operational guidance in Yemen shortly beforehand, and AQAP leaders there have since claimed responsibility for the attack.

Following this incident, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed that "Yemen must take ownership of the challenges it faces, and of its internal affairs," once again echoing the preferred U.S. policy of states taking control of extremists based within their own borders.¹ This statement is consistent with current U.S. policy toward Pakistan and more broadly with the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which declared that the United States "[focus] on the responsibilities of all states to fulfill their obligations to combat terrorism both within their borders and internationally...[and] when states prove reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations...the United States...will take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies."² For many reasons, it is very difficult for states that are targets of terrorist attacks to confront the perpetrators in another state's sovereign territory.³ Rather, it is the base state, the state in which the violent group resides, that is often best positioned to address the threat directly.⁴ Therefore, U.S. policy has increasingly placed the onus of eliminating safe havens on the base states themselves.

The first myth draws parallels between the Iraq and anti-Soviet jihads. This simple historical comparison—what I call the Afghanistan analogy—reads like a question from a high school S.A.T. exam: the Soviet-Afghan War was to Al-Qaeda in the 1980s as the Iraq War is to the global jihadist movement today. The former conflict gave rise to Al-Qaeda, an outcome recognized by many as one of the most egregious examples of blowback in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Today, the Iraq War provides jihadists with another formative opportunity to fight against a superpower. And so, according to the analogy, we should expect the current conflict to likewise exacerbate the threat posed by global jihad.

Despite this policy, there is not a clear analytical framework to understand the conditions under which base states are more likely to comply with these external demands. In this piece, I address some common misconceptions regarding the ability and willingness of base states to deal with threats that emanate from their own backyards. I then propose a framework for understanding the complex relationship between the base state and the violent group, and delineate a set of factors that can be used to forecast when base state action against such groups is more or less likely. Ultimately, this model will enable policymakers to assess the likely efficacy of a policy that places the burden of action on the base state.

Holding States to Task: Dispelling Two Straw Men

Scholars and policymakers offer two explanations for base state behavior: either the base state is a weak or failed or it is a passive or active sponsor of terrorism. Underlying these explanations are some misguided assumptions about why base states allow violent groups to organize, train, recruit, and often act from within their borders. Furthermore, this overly simplistic lens does not provide for a full examination of the phenomenon of basing and can lead to flawed policies.

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Scholars often simultaneously assert the importance of the base state, but assume that because the state is weak or failed, it is not within its capacity to act.⁵ These scholars and policymakers correctly highlight that when states become weak, non-state actors “can take opportunistic advantage of a deteriorating internal security situation to mobilize adherents, train insurgents, gain control of resources, launder funds, purchase arms, and ready themselves for assault on world order.”⁶ However, such assertions appear to be overstated, as history has repeatedly demonstrated that even ostensibly weak base states often demonstrate a remarkable capacity to act against violent groups when they deem it necessary. For example, Jordan mustered its comparatively limited capabilities to address the fedayeen in the 1950s and then again in the 1970s.⁷ More recently, the Pakistani military offensive in the Swat valley once again demonstrated, to the surprise of many, that there existed latent capabilities that could be used effectively when acting against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda became a national priority. While in some instances, states are in fact too weak to contain or eliminate the violent groups, it is often the case that the inaction is driven by will and unspoken priorities rather than capabilities.

In cases in which state weakness has not been inferred, scholars and policymakers tend to invoke either active or passive sponsorship of terrorism to explain the permissive behavior of the base states. The focus tends to be on the way in which states can aid terrorist groups, such as through financial support, training, recruitment, and basing. The basic assumption is that this relationship is static and that the support for the group is unwavering. However, not all base states offer this kind of strategic support or alliance with the groups. Thus, this characterization does not capture the variation and nuance inherent in base state support. Additionally, even in cases where strategic support exists, the sponsorship can vary dramatically over time. States have abandoned these relationships in the past when they no longer suited their needs. For example, Egypt initially actively supported fedayeen activity in the 1950s, but following the 1956 war, generally withdrew their support and curtailed the fedayeen’s freedom of action. Ultimately, using this dichotomous lens does not enable one to fully understand the phenomenon at play and unnecessarily attributes limitations to the array of choices available to base states. While state weakness and sponsorship are certainly important factors to consider, in and of themselves, they do not represent the universe of cases and are not sufficient in explaining the variation of base state responses to violent groups.

Unraveling the Political Relationship

Understanding why some base states act forcefully against violent groups requires a more complex understanding of the political relationship between the state and the group, and the costs and benefits associated with this relationship. To explain base state action, I provide a cost-benefit framework based on three central factors that define the relationship between the state and the violent group; the framework also assesses the general level of difficulty associated with acting against the group. I have identified three primary factors that highlight the interaction and interdependence between the group and the state, and capture the mechanism by which costs can be inflicted on the base state via this political relationship: grand strategic goals, regime threat, and popular legitimacy. The purpose of examining these issues is to unpack the black box of costs that the base state would incur in order to change its relationship with a particular group. The willingness of the state to act against the violent group is primarily a function of the cost associated with acting against the group within these three categories of the relationship. *Ceteris Paribus*, the lower the costs associated with acting against the violent group across the categories, the greater the likelihood that the state will alter the status quo.

In examining these key categories, policymakers can ask several key questions that highlight the level of cost associated with acting against the group.

Grand Strategic Goals: To what extent do the base state and the violent group share goals with respect to the United States, or the third party? Do they have a shared “enemy”?

“Different political relationships between the base state and the violent group would invariably present different costs and therefore levels of difficulty and probabilities of success associated with action. Understanding the areas of greatest costs and challenge enable policies that are crafted carefully to work within these limitations and have realistic expectations of base state action.”

Are their grand strategic foreign policy goals generally aligned or are there significant differences?

Through their actions, the violent group is actively pursuing a foreign policy against another state. The base state may or may not share these often ambitious foreign policy goals. When they do share them, the state may view the violent group as a cheaper means by which to pursue their strategic goals. Alternatively, the violent group may be damaging their relations with the coercing state or more broadly, their goals within the international system.

Regime Threat: Does the violent group pose a threat to the regime? Did the group originally form in opposition to the state? Or alternatively, does the regime benefit from the presence or support of the violent group? What is the relative balance of power between the base state and the violent group? What is the source (local or external) of power for the violent group?

While in theory all armed groups within a state present some threat to the regime, there can be a remarkable degree of variation in the level of threat posed. For example, for some groups, control of the base state is an explicit policy goal and therefore the threat is high. For others, the base state serves merely as a residence and the local politics are not of great interest to them; rather, their aspirations appear to be directed at the external actor.

Additionally, the balance of power between the group and the state can vary greatly, making it more or less costly for the state to act. Furthermore, the source of the group’s power can also affect the ease with which the state can cut off or alter its power supply.

Popular Legitimacy: Is the group indigenous to the state or an implant? What is the relationship of the population to the group? Does the group have popular legitimacy with the population? Was it formed as a national/popular liberation movement?

Here, popular legitimacy refers to the legitimacy of the group among a significant portion of the population. Popular legitimacy can be achieved by belonging to a local ethnic group, being involved in a popular liberation movement, or providing basic goods and services, among others. Legitimacy amongst the citizenry makes action against the group more difficult as it will likely embroil the population. This popular support can significantly constrain the actions of the government against the group and make it more costly for significant action. The more popular legitimacy the violent group possesses, the more difficult it will be for the state to act against the group.

Different political relationships between the base state and the violent group would invariably present different costs and therefore levels of difficulty and probabilities of success associated with action. Understanding the areas of greatest costs and challenge enable policies that are crafted carefully to work within these limitations and have realistic expectations of base state action.

Conclusion

This framework redirects an analysis of the base state’s costs towards a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between the state and the group. It is essential to understand that the costs associated with acting for the base state are driven by a distinct set of factors that may or may not coincide with the interests of the state that has been targeted by a particular violent group. Specifically, the threat of external terrorist attacks may factor into the calculations of the base state, but the combination of aforementioned internal domestic factors that dominate the cost and benefits of this relationship are more likely to affect the state and motivate its actions. For example, it is not sufficient to measure the threat that is posed by AQAP to the United States and extrapolate the level of urgency for Yemen. Instead, it is useful to understand the changing dynamics among

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the strategic goals of AQAP and Yemen, AQAP's ability and desire to threaten the Yemeni regime, and the popular sentiment towards Al-Qaeda and the government among the populace. These dynamics are more likely to shed light on Yemen's willingness and ability to act. One needs to be sensitive to the significant internal costs that are necessary to successfully change the status quo, while at the same time not underestimating a state's capacity for change.

Additionally, understanding the different aspects of the relationship and their costs not only helps to explain the conditions under which states are likely to act, but also how to alter the state's calculations. Specifically, unpacking this complex relationship enables an external actor to better craft both the carrots and sticks used to alter the base state's calculations. Whether calculating a costly coercive action or a positive inducement, the external actor needs to consider the costs that the base state will need to incur to change the status quo with respect to the violent group. External actors can affect the calculus for a base state, but the success of this action is dependent on a broader set of factors beyond the immediate crisis. The U.S. has launched major cooperative initiatives with both Yemen and Pakistan, but at the same time has expressed a healthy skepticism about their reform efforts to date. While training and assistance may help these countries bear the costs of action, understanding the domestic complexities may enable the U.S. to better understand the internal challenges associated with acting and thus create realistic expectations of the base state.

Understanding what motivates states to act against groups and how to affect that calculus is fundamental for eliminating current and future safe havens. This framework can provide policymakers with a more nuanced approach to understanding the complexities that define a base state situation and help avoid possible pitfalls that can result in a strengthening of the group. ■

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- 2 National Security Council (U.S.), *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (National Security Council, 2006 [cited]; available from <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS74421>. p. 17. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated this position most recently stating that "it is vital to our national security that states be willing and able to meet the full range of their sovereign responsibilities, both beyond their borders and within them." Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2008).
- 3 Challenges include, but are not limited to: the elusiveness and lack of clear address for the violent group, lack of knowledge of terrain and population, general challenges for violating sovereignty and acting militarily abroad, among others. For more on this see: Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, "Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda," ed. Rand Corporation. National Security Research Division. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002); James H. Lebovic, "Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States : US National Security Policy after 9/11," *Contemporary Security Studies* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007); Jeremy Pressman, "Rethinking Transnational Counterterrorism: Beyond a National Framework," *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 4 (2007), Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (2006); and Daniel Whiteneck, "Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework," *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (2005).
- 4 Base states are often referred to as safe havens or host states in the literature. I purposefully use the term base states since the other designations imply a certain level of safety, protection, or amicable relationship between the state and the violent group. Base state is a more neutral and descriptive term.
- 5 These findings can be found in the literature regarding how to best address failed states and the dangers they present by providing havens for terrorists and other unsavory groups. In fact, it may be the case that truly failed states are not ideal for violent groups because they are too unstable and generally lack infrastructure and the provision of basic goods. Robert I. Rotberg, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Cambridge, Mass. Washington, D.C.: World Peace Foundation ; Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
- 6 Robert Rotberg, "Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?," in *National Intelligence Council 2020 Project* (Washington D.C.: 2003).
- 7 Jordan, which by some accounts was a weak state, chose to increase border patrols and reduce fedayeen infiltrations in the 1950s and ultimately expelled the fedayeen from their territory in the 1970s, despite their limited resources. Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970* (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Carl Kaysen (1920-2010): Security Expert, JFK Advisor, and beloved member of CIS



Photo courtesy MIT news office

Carl Kaysen, MIT's David W. Skinner Professor of Political Economy (Emeritus), passed away on February 8. His contributions to intellectual life were immense, as was his influence on national policy. He will be sorely missed.

Kaysen was an active and respected member of the MIT Security Studies Program (SSP) and the Center for International Studies (CIS) since his retirement from MIT's Program in Science, Technology, and Society (STS) in 1987. During that time he also chaired the Committee on International Security Studies (CISS) of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

He had a distinguished and fruitful career as a scholar, academic leader, and government official. He was a professor of economics at Harvard University, deputy special assistant for National Security Affairs to President John F. Kennedy, director of the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton, vice chairman and director of research for the Sloan commission on higher education, and director of MIT's STS Program. A long list of fellowships and awards is testament to the high standards of excellence and creativity of his individual contributions. During the Second World War, he served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) doing intelligence analysis in support of air operations.

"Carl was an enormously knowledgeable individual whose interests spanned economics and politics. He had a matchless intelligence that could penetrate to the heart of the matter, even if he had only just heard the briefing. And he could readily bring a vast store of accumulated wisdom to the assessment of new problems," said Barry Posen, director of the Center's Security Studies Program and Ford International Professor of Political Science.

Since joining SSP, Kaysen devoted much of his scholarly energy to international security, in particular to questions of international order, including how to improve the United Nations, and how to strengthen international law. He co-authored with George Rathjens, *Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer Military Force* (1996) and co-edited *The United States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and International Law* (2000). As chair and more recently co-chair (with John Steinbruner) of the CISS, he served as godfather to several other important studies of how to manage the security challenges of the post Cold-War world. CISS has a particular interest in nuclear arms control, a matter of long-standing concern to Kaysen. He played a central role in nuclear weapons issues during his service in the Kennedy Administration.

Kaysen was always willing to advise students who were working on issues in which he had policy experience or special knowledge, particularly on matters related to nuclear weapons. He spent much time speaking with scholars and journalists about these issues as well and helped shape the historical record of the Cold War.

"Carl was a regular participant at the Security Studies Program Wednesday seminars, which feature a guest speaker. In recent years I have been privileged to direct this program and to lead these seminars. Though I kept a list during the question and answer

session that followed, Carl was on his own list. Because Carl could be counted upon to ask the crucial question that would move the conversation forward, I would call on him whenever the room needed new energy, or a speaker seemed too comfortable. Even the most incisive critique was delivered with gentle charm and a smile," said Posen.

A native of Philadelphia, Kaysen received his BA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1940. Kaysen resumed his studies after serving in World War II with the OSS, earning an MA from Harvard in 1947, and then a PhD from Harvard in economics, in 1955. Harvard named him a professor of economics in 1957.

Kaysen was predeceased in 1990 by his wife, Annette Neutra. Four years later he married Ruth Butler, a writer. He is survived by Ruth Butler; his two daughters: Susanna Kaysen of Cambridge, Jesse Kaysen of Madison, Wisconsin; and his sister, Flora Penaranda, of Bogota, Colombia.

In fall 2008, the Center interviewed Carl Kaysen. He discussed his current work, his advice to the Obama administration, his time with the Kennedy Administration, and his proudest moments.

When asked how his work is influencing public policy, he said:

"I adhere to the fundamental belief that academics who dabble in fields that aren't purely scholarly i.e., economics, politics, law, whatever... add to the stock of knowledge that affect how people and governments behave. I see myself as contributing to this."

To read the full interview, visit: http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick_interview_carl_kaysen.html

Theory and Practice in Iraq and Afghanistan

The Center sponsored a two-day workshop, "MIT Workshop on Theory and Practice in Iraq and Afghanistan" in April. The workshop was organized by Roger Petersen (professor of political science at MIT) and took place at the Center for International Studies and the MIT Faculty Club. The conference brought together prominent academics who write on civil wars and counterinsurgency with individuals who have had experience on-the-ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The panels assessed the relevance and usefulness of academic theories with regard to understanding actual dynamics on the ground. Conference attendees and panelists included MIT faculty and students. Other attendees were from Harvard's Department of Government, Harvard's Belfer Center, West Point, and the Naval War College. Panelists included a number of MIT-affiliated participants: Roger Petersen, Fotini Christia, Colin Jackson, Austin Long, Jon Lindsay, Benjamin Hung, Scott Seidel, Steve Van Evera and Andrew Radin, Nick Howard, and Jeffrey Edmonds. Additional panelists included: Jesse Driscoll, Frauke de Weijer, Monica Toft, Stathis Kalyvas and Joe Tonon.

British Foreign Secretary Delivers 2010 Compton Lecture

On March 10, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband visited MIT to deliver the 2010 Karl Taylor Compton Lecture. Miliband received a Master's from MIT's Department of Political Science in 1990. Many students and faculty members affiliated with the Center for International Studies attended the lecture: "The War in Afghanistan: How to End It." Video footage of Miliband's remarks at MIT can be found at <http://amps-webflash.amps.ms.mit.edu/public/MIT/2009-2010/Miliband/>. In addition, before delivering the lecture, Miliband was interviewed by MIT News. Text of the interview can be found at: <http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2010/3q-miliband.html>.

Bustani Middle East Seminar

Two seminars were presented in spring 2010, including: A.J. Meyer (Professor of Middle East History, Harvard University) on "The Arab Monarchy/Presidential Security States: Their Origins, Trajectories and Possible Futures" and Robert Vitalis (Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania) on "Oil Markets and Politics: Why the Left and the Right Both Get It Wrong."

Joint Seminar on South Asian Politics

The Center along with the Watson Institute at Brown and the Weatherhead Center at Harvard continued its Inter-University Seminar on South Asian politics. Among the topics and speakers were: "Explaining Partition Violence" with Steven I. Wilkinson (Yale University); "Is India a Flailing State?" with Lant Pritchett (Harvard Kennedy School); and "The Failed Civil-Military Relationship" in Pakistan with Thad Dunning (Yale University). The seminar is chaired by Ashutosh Varshney, professor of political science at Brown and visiting fellow at CIS.

Mobile Technologies: A Global Force for Change?

Two-thirds of the world's mobile phones are in developing countries—and it's the world's fastest-growing market. Can a simple cell phone provide access to health care, education and economic well-being? In short, can it change lives? A few people at MIT think it can. Panelists for this MISTI-sponsored event were: Federico Casalegno, Mobile Experience Lab Leo Celi, Sana Michael Gordon, AITI Sandy Pentland, Media Lab Jhonatan Rotberg, NextLab. Eric Debeau of Orange (France Telecom) offered an industry perspective.

International Migration Seminar

The topics and speakers for the Center's Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration were: "Translocal Governance: Migrant Associations and Democratic Accountability in Mexico" with Katrina Burgess (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy); and "Skills Shortages and Visas: Cycles of Anxiety about the U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce" with Michael Teitelbaum (Harvard Law School and Sloan Foundation; Former Vice Chair and Acting Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform).

Security Studies Seminars

Among the weekly seminars offered by the Security Studies Program were: "Israel, the Palestinians, and the One-State Agenda" (Hussein Ibish, American Task Force for Palestine); "The Violence of God: Ancient and Modern" (James Carroll, Boston Globe); "If, When, and How Social Science Can Contribute to National Security Policy" (Michael Desch, University of Notre Dame); and "History and Policy in the Nuclear Age" (Francis Gavin, University of Texas).

Film Series on Immigration

MISTI sponsored a film series on immigration including: the Mexican documentary *Rehje*, which was presented by *Rehje*'s director and producer Anais Huerta; the French film *Musulmans de France* followed by a discussion with MIT lecturer of French, Johann Sadock; and from Spain, *Extranjeras*, followed by a discussion with Carlos Ramos, a professor at Wellesley College.

Gaza: America's Response

The MIT/Harvard Working Group on Gaza, which includes among its key participants the Center for International Studies and its Program on Human Rights and Justice, sponsored an event at MIT on "America's Response to the Gaza War." Speakers included Augustus Richard Norton from Boston University; Robert Blecher of the International Crisis Group, and Uri Zaki of B'Tselem. Watch the video: <http://techtv.mit.edu/videos/6685>.

Starr Forums: Haiti, Yemen, the United Nations, et al

The Center hosted a variety of Starr Forums, including: "Rebuilding Haiti," a panel discussion with MIT scholars with ties to Haiti; "Yemen: Avoiding the Mistakes and Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq," with Ambassador Barbara Bodine, a former Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at CIS; "Death of the News?" featuring a panel of global media experts who discussed the future of global journalism; "Challenges Facing the United Nations," featuring the Swiss Ambassador to the United Nations, Peter Maurer. Starr Forums are videotaped and archived at: <http://web.mit.edu/cis/starr.html>.

People

Ph.D. Candidate **Nathan Black** presented his paper, “Does Gender Matter? The Security Consequences of Female National Leadership,” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, February 2010.

Associate Director of MIT’s International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) **Patricia Gercik** was awarded an MIT Excellence Award for bringing out the best in others.

Coordinator for MISTI’s MIT Israel Program **David Dolev** was honored at the annual Israeli Consulate Israel Independence Day celebration for “his remarkable work in supporting strong collaboration between Israel and New England.” The award was given on behalf of the state of Israel and presented by the Consulate General of Israel to New England.

Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science **Taylor Fravel** was appointed as a Research Associate with the National Asian Research Program (NARP) being launched by the National Bureau of Asian Research. In June, Fravel will speak at the Asia Policy Assembly 2010 presented by NARP.

Ph.D. Candidate **Kelly Grieco** received a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation..

Senior Administrative Assistant and Fellowship Coordinator at CIS **Casey Johnson-Houlihan** received an Infinite Mile Award from the School of Arts and Humanities in the category of “Unsung Hero.” Among the many behind-the-scene activities she was recognized for was her tireless work to help move the Center to its new location at E40.

Ph.D. Candidate **Peter Krause** was awarded a 2010-11 predoctoral fellowship in the International Security Program at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. In addition, he received a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation and a CIS Summer Study Grant to support his dissertation research and travel. Krause also presented two papers, “A Unified Framework for Analyzing Terrorism,” and “Avoiding ‘The Midas Touch’: Alternative Strategies to Measuring the Political Effectiveness of Terrorism,” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, February 2010. Institute.

Professor of Political Science **Melissa Nobles** presented her paper, “Historical Injustices in Comparative Perspective,” at two concurrent conferences: “Historical Reconciliation and Inherited Responsibility,” and “Searching for a New East Asian Order: Historical Reflections & Current Issues,” hosted by the Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University, Seoul, S. Korea, March 11-13, 2010.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center’s Security Studies Program **Barry Posen** was elected membership to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on April 19, 2010. Posen joins other CIS scholars who also are Academy members, including: Suzanne Berger, Philip Khoury, Richard Samuels, and Eugene Skolnikoff.

Ph.D. Candidate **Miranda Priebe** presented her paper, “How Secure is Saudi Oil? An Analysis of a Worst-Case Attack on Saudi Oil Infrastructure” with Ph.D. Candidate **Josh Shiffrinson** at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New

Orleans, February 2010. Priebe and Shiffrinson presented the same paper at the “Breaking Down the Walls” Conference at Arizona State University, April 2, 2010.

Ph.D. Candidate **Andrew Radin** presented on a panel focused on state-building at a CIS-sponsored “Workshop on Theory and Practice in Iraq and Afghanistan,” at MIT on April 9-10, 2010. He also presented, “Shhh... The Locals Can Hear Us Arguing: International Reform Efforts in Post-Dayton Bosnia” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, February 2010.

CIS Research Affiliate and Senior Research Scholar **Sharon Stanton Russell** is an Associate Editor of *International Migration Review* and a number of other scholarly journals have requested her to review manuscripts submitted to them. Oxford University’s Global Migration Futures project, coordinated with “The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration” Foundation, identified her as one of a small group of international experts to advise the project in a formal consultative interview process in Autumn 2009 and she also will be attending the project’s stakeholders’ workshop in The Hague in April 2010.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies **Richard Samuels** did field research in Seoul, sponsored by a fellowship from the East Asian Institute on the topic of political kidnappings. His article, comparing the reactions of Japan and South Korea to North Korean abductions, will be published in *The Journal of East Asian Studies* later this year. He also gave lectures on “Japan’s Grand Strategy” at Peking University and at Fudan University in China. In January, Samuels was a visiting professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Sciences in Tokyo where he served as an external Ph.D. dissertation examiner and collaborated with Professor Narushige Michishita on a conference paper entitled, “Hugging and Hedging: Japanese Grand Strategy in the 21st Century” for a conference on “Worldviews of Major and Aspiring Powers: Exploring Foreign Policy Debates Abroad.” In February, Samuels delivered the keynote address, “Triangulating Asian Security,” to the conference on US-China-Japan relations at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. In June, Samuels will speak at the Asia Policy Assembly presented by the National Bureau of Asian Research.

Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning **Bish Sanyal** served as the Co-Principal Investigator for curriculum development for a Rockefeller Foundation funded project to create a new university in India: the Indian Institute for Human Settlements (IIHS). Sanyal was also recently asked by the Indian Planning Commission to write a policy paper on what kind of housing policies would be needed for the urban poor.

SSP Affiliate **Carol R. Saivetz** recently presented a paper entitled “Medvedev’s ‘Zone of Privileged Interests’: Implications for Central Asia” at a conference “International Security Challenges: US-Russian-European Perspectives” sponsored by the US Army War College.

Professor of Political Science **Ben Ross Schneider** gave a talk on “Brazil and Mexico: Contracts in Governance and Development Strategy,” at a presentation for the National Intelligence Council in Washington DC, February 2010. He also presented his paper “Hierarchical Capitalism: Business, Labor Markets, and the Challenges of Equitable Development in Latin America,” at a conference on “Promoting Strategic

Responses to Globalization” at the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, November 2009. Schneider also presented “Business-Government Interaction in Policy Councils in Latin America: Collaborative Learning, Cheap Talk, or Expensive Exchanges?” at a conference on “Policies and Strategies to Face the Global Downturn” sponsored by the InterAmerican Development Bank, Barbados, October 2009.

Ph.D. Candidate **Josh Shifrinson** presented his paper, “How Secure is Saudi Oil? An Analysis of a Worst-Case Attack on Saudi Oil Infrastructure” with Ph.D. Candidate **Miranda Priebe** at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, February 2010. Priebe and Shifrinson also presented the same paper at the “Breaking Down the Walls” Conference at Arizona State University, April 2, 2010.

Associate Professor **David Singer** traveled to the Sultanate of Oman in January on a US Embassy-sponsored speaking tour on the global financial crisis.

Ph.D. Candidate **Paul Staniland** will be starting as an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago in July 2010. He presented two papers, “Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan” and “Ideologies, Coalitions, and Indian Foreign Policy” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, February 2010.

Ph.D. Candidate **Caitlin Talmadge** has accepted a tenure-track position as an assistant professor of national and international security policy at George Washington University. She will begin in fall 2011. Talmadge presented her papers, “Puzzling Performances: Explaining North and South Vietnamese Battlefield Effectiveness” and “Explaining Military Effectiveness: Political Control and Battlefield Performance,” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, February 2010. She also presented the latter paper at George Washington University.

Professor of Political Economy **Judith Tandler** presented the findings of a research project in Brazil that she has led over the past three years—“The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and Modernization of the State in Brazil: Lessons from Existing Experience for Policy and Practice”—at a seminar on the research sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (WWCIS) in Washington DC in January. The project was supported by the World Bank, DfID-UK (the UK’s foreign aid agency), and MIT. It involved a team of three advanced Brazilian doctoral students from MIT’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning—Roberto Pires, Salo Coslovsky (who also presented at the Wilson Center event), and Mansueto Almeida.

Ford Professor of Political Science **Kathleen Thelen** was awarded the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study Fellowship and Abe Fellowship for 2010-11. She was also elected Vice President (President-elect) of the American Political Science Association organized section on comparative politics. Thelen will be serving as a visiting professor at Sciences Po, Paris, this summer.

Co-Chair of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration and Professor of History at Tufts **Reed Ueda** was named director of an American Academy of Arts and Sciences workshop on ethnic minorities in the U. S. and China which will take place in June 2010.

Ford Professor of Urban Design and Planning **Lawrence J. Vale** did several radio and television interviews in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti discussing post-disaster planning and rebuilding efforts. He appeared on the BBC World Service, NPR's "Talk of the Nation" and "The Takeaway," as well as on a PBS "Frontline" program. During his 2009 sabbatical, Professor Vale also gave talks at Yale, Harvard, Penn, Tufts, NYU, Boston University, and the Technion. He continues to be a member of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on the Future of Cities (which meets each November in Dubai). He has been chosen as President-Elect of the Society for American City and Regional Planning History, and has been named MIT's Ford Professor of Urban Design and Planning.

Ford International Professor of Political Science **Stephen Van Evera** organized and led the Tobin Project Conference, "America and the World: Power Through Its Prudent Use," in Charlotte, NC, December 2009. Van Evera attended and presented on a panel at the CIS-sponsored "Workshop on Theory and Practice in Iraq and Afghanistan," at MIT on April 9-10, 2010. Van Evera also presented a talk on "American Grand Strategy for the New Era," at MIT's Draper Labs and presented another talk on "Lessons from the Life and Career of Kenneth N. Waltz," at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in New Orleans, February 2010. In October, he was a guest on Minnesota Public Radio discussing "Managing Iraq and South Asia Security Threats."

Security Studies Program Research Associate **Jim Walsh** presented a paper, "Re-conceptualizing Security Assurances: An Exploration Using the Case of Iran," at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting in New Orleans on February 20, 2010. At the same conference, he also served as a discussant for the panel, "Chasing the Chasm: Documenting the Policy-Practice Divide." In February 2010, Walsh presented "Getting the Bomb: Nuclear Myths, Puzzles and Policy Challenges," at the Dartmouth Dickey Center and the War and Peace Studies Program, Hanover, NH. He also served on a roundtable on "Fundamental Objectives of Iranian Policy in the Greater Middle East," at a conference on "Problems of the Middle East Conflict Resolution," co-sponsored by the Russian Academy of Sciences and the US National Academy of Sciences in December 2009 and another roundtable on "Iranian Nuclear Development," for the Project on Nuclear Awareness, Washington DC. Walsh also made a number of appearances on Fox, CNN, MSNBC and CSPAN and briefed a U.S. Senator Merkley (OR) staffer on Pakistan and U.S. Representative Meeks (FL) on the nuclear issue.

SSP Principal Research Scientist **Cindy Williams** testified before the Senate Budget Committee at a February 23 hearing, "Defense Budget and War Costs: An Independent Outlook." In her written statement, she points out that contrary to conventional wisdom, past increases in defense spending do not necessarily augur future growth. In December, Williams gave a talk, "US Homeland Security Eight Years After 9/11: Are We Getting Our Money's Worth?" as an alumna guest speaker at the Congressional Budget Office in Washington, DC. Williams also gave testimony on "Research Priorities at DHS's Science and Technology Directorate," before the Technology and Innovation Subcommittee of the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of Representatives, October 27, 2009. She gave a guest lecture on "US Spending for Homeland Security," at National Defense University, in November 2009.

Ph.D. Candidate **Sarah Zukerman** was awarded an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation/ ACLS Early Career Fellowships for Recent Doctoral Recipients. She will be a post-doctoral fellow at NYU's Center on International Cooperation and visiting scholar at the Salzman Institute for War & Peace at Columbia University. Zukerman gave a talk, "Bankruptcy, Guns, and Campaigns: Explaining Armed Organizations' Post-War Trajectories," at the Belfer Center, Stanford's CISAC, and Harvard's Latin America Working Group.

Published

Alice Amsden, Barton L. Weller Professor of Political Economy

“The Wild Ones: Industrial Policies in the Developing World,” in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Narcis Serra (eds.), *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered*, OUP 2009.

“The WTO: A Sweet or Sour Chinese Banquet?,” in Zdanek Drabek (ed.), *Is the World Trade Organization Attractive Enough for Emerging Economies? Critical Essays on the Multilateral Trading System*, OUP, 2010.

Diane Davis, Professor of Political Sociology

“The Political and Economic Origins of Violence and Insecurity in Contemporary Latin America: Past Trajectories and Future Prospects,” in Desmond Arias and Daniel Goldstein (eds.), *Violent Democracies in Latin America: Toward an Interdisciplinary Reconceptualization*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. [A version was reprinted in Lucia Dammert (ed.), *Crimen e Inseguridad: Políticas, Temas, y Problemas en las Américas*. Santiago: Catalonia Editorial].

Sameer Lalwani, Ph.D. Candidate

“The Pakistan Military’s Adaptation to Counterinsurgency in 2009,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 3, No. 1, January, 2010.

“Strategic Rethink Needed,” *DAWN* (Pakistan’s oldest and leading English daily), March 14, 2010.

Jon Lindsay, Ph.D. Candidate

“War Upon the Map: User Innovation in American Military Software,” *Technology and Culture* (forthcoming).

Tara Maller, Ph.D. Candidate

“The Case Against Diplomatic Sanctions,” *The Washington Quarterly* (forthcoming July 2010).

Gautam Mukunda, Ph.D. Candidate

“We Cannot Go On: Disruptive Innovation and the First World War Royal Navy,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 2010), pp. 124-159.

“What Rough Beast: Synthetic Biology, Uncertainty, and the Future of Biosecurity,” *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (September 2009), pp. 2-26 with Associate Professor of Political Science Kenneth A. Oye and Scott C. Mohr.

Melissa Nobles, Professor of Political Science

“The Prosecution of Human Rights Violations,” in *Annual Review of Political Science* (forthcoming, June 2010).

Bish Sanyal, Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning

“Similarity or Differences? What to Emphasize Now for Effective Planning Practice,” for *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*, Patsy Healey and Robert Upton, eds., Routledge, 2009.

David Singer, Associate Professor of Political Science

“Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World,” *American Political Science Review* 104 (2), 2010.

“Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility,” *International Organization* 64 (2):313-337, 2010, with Alexandra Guisinger.

“International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization,” *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1):45-60, 2010, with Bumba Mukherjee.

Eugene Skolnikoff, Professor of Political Science Emeritus

“Scientific Cooperation with China in the Face of US Controls on Technology,” *National Council of Research University Administrators (NCURA)* magazine (forthcoming, May 2010).

Kathleen Thelen, Ford Professor of Political Science

Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (co-edited with James Mahoney). New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

“Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and Change in France and Germany,” (co-authored with Bruno Palier), *Politics & Society* (March 2010).

“Economic Regulation and Social Solidarity: Conceptual and Analytic Innovations in the Study of Advanced Capitalism,” *Socio-Economic Review* (October 2009), 1-21.

Jim Walsh, Security Studies Program Research Associate

“2010: Unfortunately, More of the Same,” *Gozarash* [Iranian magazine], March 2010.

“Iran and the Problem of Tactical Myopia,” *Arms Control Today*. Vol. 39 (December, 2009), with Thomas Pickering, and William Luers.

Cindy Williams, SSP Principal Research Scientist

Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home (New York: Routledge), 2010, with Dr. Gordon Adams.

Williams’ edited volume, *Filling the Ranks: The Transformation of Military Personnel Policy*, has been translated into Chinese and published by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of China as Cindy Williams (editor), *Filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System* (Chinese language translation) (Taipei: Military History and Translation Office, Ministry of National Defense, ROC, 2009)

Students Receive Funds for Global Studies

The Center offers and facilitates funding opportunities for MIT students to do work on global issues. For example, the Program on Human Rights and Justice recently announced the recipients of its summer internships for students at MIT who wish to study human rights either at the field level or through applied research. This year's recipients, followed by their host organizations, are: Robert J. Crauderuff, Greensboro NAACP, USA; Andrea A. Betancourt, Giral-Brazil, Brazil; Anahita Maghami, Afghanistan Samsortya, USA; and Christophe Chung, UNHCR, Ethiopia. In addition, the Center announced the winner of a National Security Education Program (NSEP) Boren Fellowship. The recipient, Kyoung Marvin Shin, will use the fellowship for fieldwork in several municipalities in China, analyzing the local politics of clean energy policymaking, development, and deployment. And, the Center announced the recipients of its Summer Study Grants, which went to nineteen MIT doctoral students from the Sloan School, the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, and the Department of Political Science. More details on funding opportunities offered by or facilitated through the Center are available here: http://web.mit.edu/cis/fo_cisfg.html.

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